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PUTTING MONEY BACK INTO
CONSUMERS’ POCKETS: AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF THE CFPB’S CIVIL PENALTY
FUND
Craig Cowie*
One of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (“CFPB”) primary goals is to protect consumers. Protecting consumers necessarily
means ensuring that companies and individuals stop violating the consumer
laws. But stopping illegal conduct in the future does not help the consumers
who have already been harmed. In many of the cases prosecuted by the
CFPB, the defendants illegally took money out of the pockets of consumers:
they charged fees that were expressly illegal; they charged consumers more
than the consumers owed or more than the defendants had disclosed; and
they deceived consumers about what the consumers were buying or how
much it would cost. Remediating this harm—giving back money actually
taken from consumers through the defendants’ illegal conduct—is an essential part of protecting consumers, and through the end of its 2019 fiscal
year, the CFPB often required the defendants to pay consumers directly for
the harm identified by the CFPB.
In approximately 13% of the cases in which some relief was ordered,
however, the defendants did not have the financial wherewithal to remediate consumers fully: they were bankrupt; they were banned from their respective industries or ordered to cease operations altogether; and in some
cases, the principals were jailed. If consumers had to rely on these defendants for relief, they likely would be, quite simply, out of luck. Through the
use of a previously unstudied mechanism, the Civil Penalty Fund, however,
the CFPB is providing relief to all of them—hundreds of thousands of consumers across twenty-seven cases. Congress created the Fund in the DoddFrank Act and required that all civil money penalties collected by the CFPB
be placed into the Fund. Further, Congress required that the CFPB use the
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Fund in the first instance to provide monetary relief to consumers who otherwise would not receive compensation for harm caused by the defendants
in CFPB enforcement actions.
And the defendants in these twenty-seven cases caused hundreds of
thousands of consumers substantial amounts of monetary harm. Despite the
fact that these companies had limited resources, they caused a total of
$671.2 million in uncompensated harm with an average of over $24.9 million per case and a median of $10 million per case. Through the end of the
CFPB’s 2019 fiscal year, the CFPB had used the Fund to send more than
905,000 checks, with an overall average of $494. In 70% of the cases, the
average check sent was $1,000 or more, and more than 177,000 checks
were sent in cases where the average check sent was at least $1,000.
This Article expands on the growing body of scholarly literature regarding public enforcement of consumer laws. Although that scholarship
has addressed the effectiveness and propriety of public enforcement, even
raising concerns about judgment-proof defendants, there is virtually no
substantive mention of the Civil Penalty Fund or its operations despite the
magnitude of monetary relief it provides to consumers. This Article is the
first empirical analysis of the Fund’s operation and the assessment and collection of civil money penalties that are used by the Fund to remediate consumers.
After explaining the Fund’s operation, the Article finds that the Fund
is an efficient way to provide significant monetary relief to consumers who
otherwise would not receive any compensation for their losses from defendants’ unlawful conduct, including through private litigation. The Fund also
is putting money back into consumers’ pockets. In all but one of the cases,
the defendants either charged fees expressly prohibited by law, took
amounts that were not disclosed or owed, deceived consumers about the
cost or material aspects of the services that they were purchasing, or some
combination thereof. The Article finds that the structure of the Fund creates
positive incentives for regulators to bring important cases.
As is noted in the literature, states and other regulators also bring
enforcement actions against similar defendants—those who cause consumers monetary harm but cannot pay it back. Based on the evidence regarding
the Civil Penalty Fund’s operation, this Article therefore recommends that
states adopt similar consumer restitution funds. The Article details several
issues that legislatures should consider in implementing their own funds
and ends by providing draft language for creating and implementing such
a fund.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Through March 31, 2019, defendants in 162 cases brought by the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) were ordered to pay civil money penalties.1 In 135 of those cases, the CFPB determined that after the defendants complied with the orders there would be no remaining compensable, uncompensated
harm.2 In the remaining twenty-seven cases, however, the CFPB determined that
the defendants had caused consumers more than $671 million in harm that the
defendants could not repay and that the consumers were not reasonably expected
to recover from any other sources.3 But the CFPB could, and did, provide relief
to those harmed consumers when the defendants could not. Using a little-studied
mechanism, the Civil Penalty Fund (the “Fund”), the CFPB was able to use penalties paid by defendants in all of the CFPB’s enforcement actions to compensate
consumers for all $671 million of that harm.4 As of December 2019, the CFPB
1. Craig Cowie, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Decisions and Calculations (Sept. 3, 2020) (on
file with author). See generally CFPB, FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION: FISCAL YEAR 2019, at 18–29 (2019), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/bcfp_annualfinancial-report_fy-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/P98S-59GG].
2. See discussion infra Section IV.A.2 below for a discussion regarding the definition of compensable,
uncompensated harm. For additional details on the types and amounts of relief provided in CFPB enforcement
actions, see, for example, Christopher L. Peterson, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Law Enforcement:
An Empirical Review, 90 TUL. L. REV. 1057, 1078 fig.2 & 1081 tbl.2 (2016) (discussing consumer relief through
2015); Prentiss Cox, Amy Widman & Mark Totten, Strategies of Public UDAP Enforcement, 55 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 37, 70 fig.6 & tbl.5., 71 fig.7 & tbl.6, 75 tbl.9, 76 tbl.10 (2018) (discussing CFPB actions in 2014). In
some cases, the defendants have provided redress, and in others, the CFPB determined that there was no compensable harm. Compare Bank of America, N.A., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0004, 21–25 (Apr. 9, 2014) (ordering
payment of redress estimated at more than $700 million), and CFPB Orders Bank of America to Pay $727 Million
in Consumer Relief for Illegal Credit Card Practices, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-orders-bank-of-america-to-pay-727-million-in-consumer-relief-for-illegal-credit-card-practices/
[https://perma.cc/J44F-JWUQ], with Lighthouse Title, Inc., CFPB 2014-CFPB-0015, 7–15 (Sept. 30, 2014) (ordering injunctive relief and penalties but not payment of redress). See also CFPB, FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU: FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 40–41 (2017), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy17.pdf [https://perma.cc/4THJ-Z3D7] [hereinafter “2016
FINANCIAL REPORT”].
3. See infra Table 9.
4. Given the length of time between resolution of a case and the CFPB’s release of information regarding
any payments from the Fund, unless stated otherwise, this Article examines cases resolved through March 31,
2019. See, e.g., Civil Penalty Fund, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmedconsumers/civil-penalty-fund/ (last visited May 13, 2021) [https://perma.cc/UUH8-32BY].
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reported that checks totaling more than $447 million had been sent to consumers
harmed in twenty of those cases.5
Defendants in these twenty-seven cases generally did not have the financial
resources to pay consumers for the harm the defendants had caused: they were
bankrupt; they were banned from their respective industries or ordered to cease
operations altogether; and in some cases, the principals were jailed.6 Yet, these
defendants had caused a substantial amount of harm, an average of over $24.9
million per case and a median of $10 million per case.7 Through March 31, 2019,
the CFPB had used the Fund to send more than 905,000 checks, with an overall
average of $494.8 In 70% of the cases, the average check sent was $1,000 or
more; and more than 177,000 checks were sent in cases where the average check
sent was at least $1,000.9
As just one example, in the Student Loan Processing case, defendants ran
an illegal student debt-relief scheme; they charged borrowers unlawful fees and
deceived the borrowers about the costs of defendants’ services and defendants’
affiliations with the government.10 Based on sworn statements regarding the defendants’ financial conditions, the stipulated judgment required defendants to
cease their operations and pay $326,001 in redress and penalties, leaving an additional $7.9 million in unremediated consumer harm.11 The CFPB used the Fund
to give these consumers back the money that the defendants had taken illegally,
sending 4,800 checks averaging $1,650 to harmed consumers.12
Despite the significant amount of harm remediated by the Fund, there has
been virtually no mention of this mechanism in the scholarly literature.13 This

5. All of these cases resolved before September 30, 2018, the end of the CFPB’s 2018 fiscal year, and as
of February 2020, the CFPB had not published data on how much in relief it had sent to consumers for the
remaining seven cases. See infra Table 3.
6. See discussion infra Section IV.C.2; see, e.g., Payments to Harmed Consumers, CFPB, https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/ (last visited May 13, 2021) [https://
perma.cc/35DL-2XLN].
7. See Cowie, supra note 1.
8. See infra Table 3.
9. See infra Tables 2 & 6.
10. Complaint at 4–12, CFPB v. IrvineWebWorks, Inc., No. 8:14-cv-01967 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2014).
11. Stipulated Final Judgment and Order at 6–8 & 10, CFPB v. IrvineWebWorks, Inc., No. 8:14-cv-01967
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2016). In addition, the order required defendants to set aside funds necessary to wind down
their operations, and if any of those funds remained after the cessation, the defendants had to pay those funds as
a penalty as well. Id. at 11.
12. Cowie, supra note 1.
13. Others have discussed the relief provided by the CFPB or the penalties imposed, but without discussing
the use of the Civil Penalty Fund. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, CONSUMER FED’N AMERICA, DORMANT:
THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU’S LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM IN DECLINE 2–3 (2019),
https://consumerfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CFPB-Enforcement-in-Decline.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
RQ9G-CJPF] (discussing decreases in the number of overall cases and restitution awarded, but mentioning only
one penalty imposed by the Bureau); Cox et al., supra note 2, at 80 (discussing relief provided in CFPB enforcement actions in 2014); Peterson, supra note 2, at 1078 fig. 2 (analyzing consumer relief provided through CFPB
enforcement actions from 2012 through 2015); Donald C. Lampe & Ryan J. Richardson, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau at Five: A Survey of the Bureau’s Activities, 21 N.C. BANKING INST. 85, 123–24 (2017)
(mentioning the range of civil money penalties assessed in the CFPB’s first five years and noting the penalties
assessed in a few cases); Kelly Thompson Cochran, The CFPB at Five Years: Beyond the Numbers, 21 N.C.
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Article is the first empirical analysis of the CFPB’s use of the Fund and concludes that it is an efficient mechanism for providing real monetary relief to
harmed consumers. Ninety-five percent of the amount allocated from the Fund
has been allocated for remediating consumer harm, and only 1% has been set
aside for administrative costs.14 As a result, the Article recommends that states
adopt similar consumer restitution funds.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part II lays out the basic history of the
Fund and explains its operation. Part III summarizes the results of an empirical
analysis of the CFPB’s use of the Fund, including assessing the amounts allocated and actually distributed to consumers, as well as the success of those distributions. Part IV explores the benefits and costs of the Fund’s operation, finding
that the Fund is providing consumers with significant relief—generally by returning money that defendants had taken unlawfully—and that, absent the Fund,
these consumers likely would receive little to no relief from other sources. Part
IV concludes that the CFPB has operated the Fund with minimal overhead costs.
Finally, Part V argues that states with a variety of different enforcement strategies could operate similar funds successfully and that the existence of a fund
creates incentives to bring important cases while undermining or eliminating
possible undesirable incentives.
II. IN RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, CONGRESS CREATED A CIVIL
PENALTY FUND THAT ALLOWED THE CFPB TO PROVIDE COMPENSATION TO
HARMED CONSUMERS EVEN IF THE DEFENDANTS WHO HARMED THEM COULD
NOT
A.

Congress Created the CFPB to Ensure Consistent Enforcement of
Consumer Laws

Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act15 as “a direct and comprehensive response to the financial crisis that nearly crippled the U.S. economy beginning in
2008” and to fix “the failure of the federal banking and other regulators to address significant consumer protection issues.”16 The Dodd-Frank Act, and in particular Title X of the Act (the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010),17
created the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection,18 more commonly known

BANKING INST. 55, 59 (2017) (noting that the CFPB had assessed “more than half a billion dollars” in civil money
penalties, including a $100 million CMP against Wells Fargo).
14. The remainder has been allocated for consumer education and financial literacy programs. Civil Penalty Fund, supra note 4.
15. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
16. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 2, 9 (2010).
17. Dodd-Frank, supra note 15, § 1001.
18. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a).
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as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau19 or the CFPB.20 Congress charged
the CFPB with regulating the “offering and provision of consumer financial
products or services under the Federal consumer financial laws”21 and protecting
consumers from unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices.22 Congress gave the
CFPB numerous powers to effectuate its charge and objectives, including, inter
alia, the power to issue regulations23 and to supervise specified financial institutions.24
One of the CFPB’s “primary functions . . . [is] taking appropriate enforcement action to address violations of Federal consumer financial law.”25 In so
doing, the CFPB can seek a wide variety of remedies, including monetary relief,
injunctive relief, and civil money penalties.26 In particular, Congress expressly
authorized the CFPB to seek relief that would provide money directly to consumers harmed by the defendants27 in any given case.28 Recognizing that not
every defendant would be able to remediate consumers for the harm he, she, or
it caused, however, Congress also mandated the creation of a Civil Penalty
Fund.29

19. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank, supra note 15, § 336(a)(1)–(3), § 1091, § 1100G(a) (referring to the “Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau”).
20. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 111-176, 1 at 11 (2010) (“This legislation creates the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB), a new, streamlined independent consumer entity housed within the Federal Reserve
System.”).
21. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a).
22. Id. § 5511(b)(2).
23. Id. §§ 5513(b), 5531(b).
24. Id. § 5511(c)(4). See generally Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 343–62 (2013) (discussing CFPB’s authorities); Peterson, supra
note 2, at 1064–73 (explaining the same).
25. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5511(c)(4), 5481(14) (defining federal consumer financial law). The CFPB may file actions in federal court, 12 U.S.C. § 5564(a), (f), or file an administrative adjudication proceeding before its Office
of Administrative Adjudication, § 5563(a). See generally 12 C.F.R. § 1081 (2019) (Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings).
26. 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a)(2). The CFPB can seek the same relief in either federal court or an administrative
adjudication proceeding. § 5565(a)(1).
27. When the CFPB files an action against a person in federal court, that person is referred to as a defendant; when the CFPB files an action against a person in an adjudication proceeding, that person is referred to as a
respondent. This Article refers to both groups as “defendants,” as that is the term used in the Civil Penalty Fund
Rule. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.101 (2013) (defining “Bureau enforcement actions” as “any judicial or administrative
action or proceeding” and “defendant” as “a party in a Bureau enforcement action that is found or alleged to have
committed a violation”).
28. 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a)(2)(B) (“refund of moneys or return of real property”), (a)(2)(C) (“restitution”),
(a)(2)(E) (“payment of damages or other monetary relief”); cf. § 5565(a)(2)(A) (“rescission or reformation of
contracts”).
29. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(d)(1) (“There is established in the Federal Reserve a separate fund, to be known as
the ‘Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund’ (referred to in this section as the ‘Civil Penalty Fund’).”).
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B. The Civil Penalty Fund Uses Penalties Imposed for Violations of
Consumer Laws To Compensate Consumers Harmed by Those Violations Who
Otherwise Would Not Receive Redress
Penalties for unlawful conduct are an important enforcement tool, both to
punish wrongdoers for violating the law and to deter others from violating the
laws in similar ways. Numerous government enforcers have the power to impose
civil money penalties for violations of the law.30 In most cases, these penalties
are paid into a general fund or are used by the enforcer to fund its own operations.31
In creating the CFPB, Congress also authorized the imposition of penalties,
providing that “[a]ny person that violates, through any act or omission, any provision of Federal consumer financial law shall forfeit and pay a civil penalty.”32
Congress established different limits based on the defendant’s actions and mandated consideration of a number of factors in imposing any penalty, including
the defendant’s financial resources and good faith, the gravity of the violations,
the severity of harm to the consumer, and the history of prior violations.33 The
CFPB has used its authority to penalize wrongdoers, including, for example, imposing a $20 million penalty on Bank of America for illegal conduct that caused
more than $725 million in harm to 1.9 million consumers,34 imposing a $100
million penalty on Equifax for harming 147 million people,35 and—after having
prosecuted Wells Fargo three previous times for consumer law violations—imposing a $1 billion penalty in a fourth case, although Wells Fargo received credit
for the $500 million penalty the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency imposed for related conduct.36
Rather than paying penalties like these to the U.S. Treasury, however, Congress mandated that all penalties collected by the CFPB must go into the Civil
30. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 350-d (McKinney 2019) (allowing civil penalties for violations of
specified consumer laws); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-142 (2019) (same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2522(b)
(West 2019) (same); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1531(A) (2019) (same); 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1) (allowing the
Federal Trade Commission to seek civil penalties for violations of consumer laws in specified circumstances).
31. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2527 (West 2019) (mandating payment of penalties into a fund for
payment of operational expenses related to enforcing consumer laws); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-143 (2019)
(requiring payment of penalties into either the general fund or a special revenue account for defraying certain
expenses).
32. 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c)(1).
33. Id. § 5565(c)(2), (3) (setting different maximum penalties when the defendant recklessly or knowingly
violates Federal consumer financial law).
34. Press Release, Consumer Finance Protection Bureau, CFPB Orders Bank of America to Pay $727
Million in Consumer Relief for Illegal Credit Card Practices (Apr. 09, 2014), https://www.consumerfinance.
gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-orders-bank-of-america-to-pay-727-million-in-consumer-relief-for-illegal-creditcard-practices/ [https://perma.cc/J44F-JWUQ].
35. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 3, 49, 60, CFPB v. Equifax, Inc.,
No. 1:19-cv-3300-TWT (N.D. Ga. July 23, 2019) (imposing a $100 million penalty and $425 million judgment
for unlawfully failing to take basic steps to protect the data of 147 million consumers whose information was
exposed in a data breach).
36. Consent Order at 5–6, 10, 23–24, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2018-BCFP-0001 (Apr. 20,
2018) (finding that Wells Fargo charged consumers for mortgage interest-rate-lock extensions when it should not
have and illegally forced consumers to pay for auto insurance they did not need or request).
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Penalty Fund37 to be used in the first instance to pay people harmed by the defendants in CFPB enforcement actions.38 Only if victims cannot be found or payments are not practicable, may the CFPB use the Fund for “the purpose of consumer education and financial literacy programs.”39
The CFPB has used the vast majority of its payments from the Fund to
provide monetary relief to consumers who were harmed by defendants that did
not have the resources to pay back those consumers for the harm the defendants
caused.40 Through November 2019,41 the CFPB has allocated more than $671
million from the Fund to remediate consumers harmed by the defendants in
CFPB enforcement actions, and $28.8 million for consumer education and financial literacy programs.42
Both the Dodd-Frank Act43 and the Civil Penalty Fund Rule44 impose certain conditions on the use of the Fund. First, as is noted above, the CFPB must
use available funds to provide relief to consumers first, and only if that is not
practicable may the CFPB use the funds for educational purposes.45 Second, consumers are only eligible to receive payments from the Fund if a final order46
37. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(d)(1) (“If the Bureau obtains a civil penalty against any person in any judicial or
administrative action under Federal consumer financial laws, the Bureau shall deposit into the Civil Penalty Fund,
the amount of the penalty collected.” (emphasis added)). If the CFPB or a court imposes a penalty, but the defendant does not pay it, no money from that penalty will go into the Fund (although consumers harmed by that
defendant can receive payments from the Fund if the other requirements are met).
38. Id. § 5497(d)(2) (“Amounts in the Civil Penalty Fund shall be available to the Bureau, without fiscal
year limitation, for payments to the victims of activities for which civil penalties have been imposed under the
Federal consumer financial laws.”).
39. Id. (“To the extent that such victims cannot be located or such payments are otherwise not practicable,
the Bureau may use such funds for the purpose of consumer education and financial literacy programs.”); 12
C.F.R. § 1075.107(a) (2013) (allowing allocation for educational purposes only if funds “remain after the Fund
Administrator allocates funds as described in §1075.106(a)”); § 1075.106(a) (requiring that if there are sufficient
funds in the Fund, “the Fund Administrator will allocate to each class of victims the amount necessary to compensate fully the uncompensated harm . . . [to] all victims in that class to whom it is practicable to make payments . . . .” (emphasis added)). Because §1075.107(a) allows allocation for educational purposes only if funds
remain after the allocation of funds under § 1075.106(a), which requires complete remediation of all harm to all
eligible victims, funds may be allocated for educational purposes only after there is no remaining compensable,
uncompensated harm. See also 12 C.F.R. § 1075.106(d)(2) (preventing the Fund Administrator from allocating
funds for educational purposes that she did not allocate to eligible victims with compensable, uncompensated
harm through the use of her discretion under section 1075.106(d)(1)). If there are not sufficient funds necessary
to compensate fully all uncompensated harm, the allocation occurs pursuant to section 1075.106(b), and section
1075.107(a) does not apply.
40. See discussion infra Section IV.C. In many cases, the defendants could pay some amount, but could
not cover all of the harm they caused. Infra Section IV.C. In one case (Amerisave), the defendant paid more in
redress and penalties than the harm it caused, and the CFPB used the Fund to remediate some of the harm caused.
See discussion infra notes 195, 197.
41. The CFPB allocates funds in May and November each year.
42. Cowie, supra note 1.
43. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(d)(2).
44. On May 7, 2013, the CFPB issued a final rule to implement Section 1017(d)(2) of the Dodd-Frank Act,
12 U.S.C. § 5497(d)(2), that made the Fund created in Section 1017(d)(1) available to remediate victims when
certain conditions are met. Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund, 78 Fed. Reg. 26,489 (May 7, 2013) (codified
at 12 C.F.R. Pt. 1075) [hereinafter Civil Penalty Fund Rule].
45. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(d)(2); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 1075 (2013).
46. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.101 (2013) (defining “Final order”); § 1075.103 (requiring penalty be imposed by a
“final order”).
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imposes (1) a penalty on the defendant (2) in a Bureau enforcement action (3) for
a violation that harmed the consumer.47 Third, as will be explained in more detail, eligible consumers may receive payments only for compensable, uncompensated harm, as those terms are defined in the Civil Penalty Fund Rule.48
Every six months, the CFPB determines whether consumers in its enforcement actions49 have any compensable, uncompensated harm.50 If they do, the
CFPB must allocate any available money from the Fund to remediate that harm.51
If there are not sufficient funds to remediate all of the harm, which has happened
only twice,52 it allocates money to consumers harmed by conduct in the most
recent orders first.53 In allocating funds, the CFPB may exercise discretion in
determining that payments are impracticable or in apportioning funds among eligible consumers where there are not sufficient funds to remediate all harm.54
47. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.103 (2013); 12 U.S.C. § 5497(d)(2). Bureau enforcement action is defined to include
both actions in federal court and administrative adjudication proceedings. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.101.
48. See infra Section IV.A.2.
49. Only cases in which civil money penalties are imposed are reviewed. See 12 C.F.R. § 1075.103 (requiring that consumers eligible for payments from the Fund be harmed by a violation for which a penalty was
imposed).
50. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.105(b)(1)(i). The periods must be consecutive, with each new period starting the day
after the prior period ended. Id. Pursuant to the schedule set by the CFPB, a period starts on the first day of the
fiscal year (October 1) and the first day of the third quarter of the fiscal year (April 1). Civil Penalty Fund Allocation Schedule, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/allocation-schedule/ [https://perma.cc/9LH2-TXBY]. The first period started July 21, 2011 and ended
March 31, 2013. CFPB, FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 25 (2013)
[hereinafter 2013 FINANCIAL REPORT]; see also 12 C.F.R. § 1075.105(b)(1)(ii) (allowing the first period to be
longer or shorter than six months); § 1075.105(b)(1)(iii) (providing that the first period must start on July 21,
2011). The administrator must allocate the funds for a given period within sixty days after the end of the period.
12 C.F.R. § 1075.105(b)(2).
51. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.105(b)(2) (“The fund administrator will allocate available funds in the Civil Penalty
Fund in accordance with §§1075.106 and 1075.107.” (emphasis added)).
52. 2016 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 37; CFPB, FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 26 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 FINANCIAL REPORT].
53. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.106(b)(1) (“If funds remain after allocating to each class of victims from that sixmonth period the amount necessary to compensate fully the uncompensated harm . . . of all victims in that class
to whom it is practicable to make payments, the Fund Administrator next will allocate funds to classes of victims
from the preceding six-month period, and so forth until no funds remain.”). Harmed consumers who are members
of a class of victims are from the six-month period in which they first had uncompensated harm as defined by
the rule. §1075.106(b)(2). Generally speaking, the harm from the violations becomes “uncompensated harm” for
purposes of the rule once it becomes clear that a class will not be compensated. Id.
54. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.106(c). The Civil Penalty Fund Rule refers to the practicability of making payments
in a number of provisions. Generally, the rule gives the fund administrator considerable discretion to determine
whether payments are “practicable.” See 12 C.F.R. § 1075.109(a)(6) (providing that payments to an individual
are impracticable when the “Fund Administrator determines that other circumstances make it unreasonable to
make a payment to the victim.”); § 1075.109(b)(3) (providing that payments to a class are impracticable if the
fund administrator makes the same determination about payments to the class). But the rule identifies a number
of situations where payments will be deemed impracticable. § 1075.109(a)(1)–(5) (deeming payments to individuals impracticable, inter alia, when the payments are not redeemed in a reasonable time, the victim cannot be
located, the payment is too small given the cost of locating the victim and making the payment, the payment is
so small that redemption is unlikely, and the victim fails to provide information required by the distribution plan);
§ 1075.109(b)(1)–(2) (deeming payments to a class impracticable when the aggregate amount is too small given
the costs of locating the victims and making the payments or when payments to individuals in the class are
impracticable); cf. Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair Fund
Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 342 (2015) (noting that one of the two key factors the SEC considers in
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After funds have been allocated, the CFPB hires a vendor to send checks to consumers.55 Any amounts that are not cashed by consumers are returned to the
Fund.56 The CFPB uses the Fund itself to pay for this entire process by “setting
aside” funds for administrative expenses.57
III. AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CFPB’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CIVIL PENALTY FUND DEMONSTRATES THAT THE FUND PROVIDES
SUBSTANTIAL MONETARY RELIEF TO HARMED CONSUMERS
A.

Methodology

In compiling the data cited herein regarding the CFPB’s use of the Civil
Penalty Fund, the author reviewed every enforcement action listed on the
CFPB’s website,58 listed on the CFPB’s Office of Administrative Adjudication’s
docket,59 or mentioned in the CFPB’s financial reports.60 When necessary, additional documents related to these cases were pulled from the federal court dockets or the CFPB’s Office of Administrative Adjudication’s docket. The author
also reviewed all of the CFPB’s quarterly and annual financial reports and its
memoranda on distributions from the Fund. For cases in which the Fund was
used to compensate consumers and case documents did not indicate the financial
or operating status of the defendants, the author reviewed the defendants’ and
various Secretary of State websites to determine whether the defendants continued to operate. For each case, the author coded more than 140 variables related
to the case, including the amount of relief and penalties ordered, the types of
harm caused, the amount collected, and any amounts allocated or distributed
from the Fund to consumers harmed by the defendants in that case. Given the

determining whether to distribute money from a fair fund to harmed investors is whether the amount available to
pay each investor justifies the cost of the distribution).
55. See 12 C.F.R. § 1075.108 (allowing designation of a payments administrator). Through February 2020,
the CFPB has reported using Epiq Systems, Inc., eleven times, Rust Consulting seven, and Analytics Solutions
twice. The FTC also has used all three vendors, as well as others, to distribute refunds to harmed consumers.
Cowie, supra note 1; Recent FTC Cases Resulting in Refunds, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/refunds [https://perma.cc/4EEZ-HVM8].
56. See 12 C.F.R. § 1075.108(e), 1075.109(a)(5).
57. Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund, 78 Fed. Reg. 26,489, 26,496 (May 7, 2013); 12 C.F.R.
§ 1075.105(c)(3).
58. See Enforcement Actions, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/enforcement/actions/ [https://perma.cc/N24P-QEZ6]. The CFPB states that it will post court documents on its website
when it takes enforcement action. Id. But see discussion infra note 60.
59. Docket of the Office of Administrative Adjudication, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/administrative-adjudication-docket/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2021) [https://
perma.cc/6ASV-D9W2].
60. Financial Reports, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/budget-strategy/financial-reports/ [https://perma.cc/APT4-Z4YU]. Only one case mentioned in the reports did not have a webpage on the
Bureau’s Enforcement Actions page. See Republic Mortgage Ins. Co., CFPB No. 1:13-cv-24146-JAL (Nov. 19,
2013); Peterson, supra note 2, at 1063.The author also cross-referenced the results of these searches against other
analyses of CFPB enforcement actions and CFPB press releases to verify that there were no additional actions.
See Peterson, supra note 2.
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length of time between resolution of a case and the CFPB’s release of information regarding any payments from the Fund, unless stated otherwise, this Article examines cases resolved through March 31, 2019 for which allocation data
was available by February 2020.
B.

The CFPB Has Allocated Hundreds of Millions of Dollars from the Fund
to Harmed Consumers

Through the end of the second quarter of the CFPB’s 2019 fiscal year,61 the
CFPB had allocated more than $671 million to compensate victims in twentyseven cases. This amount was sufficient to compensate all of the consumers’
compensable, uncompensated harm, as those terms are defined in the Civil Penalty Fund Rule,62 in each of the twenty-seven cases.
The defendants in each of these cases caused a significant amount of unremediated harm, even as narrowly defined by the Civil Penalty Fund Rule. The
average allocation per case was $24.9 million with a median of $10 million.63 As
is clear from the table and graph below, just over 70% of the allocations are between $1 million and $25 million with a cluster of allocations (seven) between
$1 million and $5 million.64 Further, there were six cases over $25 million, with
two of those being over $100 million (and a third case was $94.8 million).65 Only
two of the cases had allocations below $1 million, and each of those was almost
$500,000.66

61. Although the allocation itself occurred on May 29, 2019, the allocation covered all cases that became
final, within the meaning of the Civil Penalty Fund Rule by the end of the second quarter of the 2019 fiscal year,
Mar. 31, 2019. ELIZABETH REILLY, CFPB, CFO UPDATE FOR THE THIRD QUARTER OF FISCAL YEAR 2019 8–9
(2019), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_cfo-update_report_fy-2019_q3.pdf [https://perma.
cc/JDJ7-7CSE] [hereinafter Q3 2019 CFO REPORT].
62. Civil Penalty Fund Rule, supra note 44, at 26489; 12 C.F.R. § 1075.104(b)–(c).
63. See Cowie, supra note 1.
64. See infra Graph 1.
65. See infra Table 1.
66. See infra Table 1.
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TABLE 1
Amount Allocated

Number of Cases

$100mm or more

2

$50mm to $100mm

2

$25mm to $50mm

2

$20mm to $25mm

3

$15mm to $20mm

2

$10mm to $15mm

3

$5mm to $10mm

4

$1mm to $5mm

7

<$1mm

2

Total

27

Based on the three allocations completed as of May 29, 2019, the CFPB’s
practices with respect to allocation do not appear to have changed significantly
under a new administration.67 Given that the tenth allocation occurred just days
after Director Cordray’s resignation,68 this Article compares the first ten allocations with the three allocations under Director Kraninger or Acting Director Mulvaney. Because there have been only five cases69 with compensable, uncompensated harm in the eleventh through thirteenth allocations, comparing the means
and medians is of somewhat limited utility. Nonetheless, the average allocation
in periods eleven through thirteen is $24 million,70 which is fairly close to the
67. See 2018 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 52, at 28. As is noted supra in note 61, the allocation for all
cases with final orders as of March 31, 2019, occurred on May 29, 2019.
68. Richard Cordray resigned effective November 24, 2017, and President Trump appointed Mick Mulvaney as acting director that same day. Kevin McCoy, Richard Cordray Resigns as Director of Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, USA TODAY (Nov. 24, 2017, 4:48 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/
2017/11/24/richard-cordray-resigns-director-consumer-financial-protection-bureau/893489001/ [https://perma.
cc/4ZSH-T8YT]. Mulvaney’s appointment was effective the next day, November 25, 2017. Alan S. Kaplinsky,
How Long Can Mick Mulvaney Serve as CFPB Acting Director?, CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2018/02/27/how-long-can-mick-mulvaney-serve-as-cfpb-acting-director/ [https://perma.cc/JFZ2-TWKQ]. The tenth allocation happened on November 29, 2017, which is roughly
the same amount of time after the close of the fiscal year as all other allocations governing the latter half of a
fiscal year. 2018 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 52, at 25. President Trump later nominated Kathleen Kraninger
as the director, and she became director effective December 11, 2018, after the Senate confirmed her. Alan S.
Kaplinsky, Kathy Kraninger’s First Day as Director of the BCFP, CONSUMER FINANCE MONITOR (Dec.
11, 2018), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2018/12/11/kathy-kraningers-first-day-as-director-of-thebcfp/ [https://perma.cc/K7DG-4DHQ].
69. In addition, there were two cases that received a second allocation in period eleven. 2018 FINANCIAL
REPORT, supra note 52, at 29. The second allocations were roughly half the first allocations, which occurred in
period ten. Id.
70. This average is to assess whether there has been a change in the determination of the total harm, as
reflected by the allocation. Because two of the allocations in period eleven were only partial allocations to complete the allocation amounts determined in period ten, they are excluded from the average for period eleven and
are included in the average for period ten. See id. If they were included in period eleven, the average for periods
eleven through thirteen would be $19.3 million, and the average for periods one through ten would be $24.4
million.
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average of $25.1 million for periods one through ten.71 In addition, it is worth
noting that of those five allocations, one was the CFPB’s fourth largest allocation, $69.6 million, and another was $35.2 million.72 Further, the number of cases
that received allocations in a given period does not seem to have changed significantly. The average and median number of allocations per period overall are
two, and those numbers are the same for periods one through ten and periods
eleven through thirteen.73
C.

The CFPB Has Distributed More than $400 Million to Consumers
Through the Civil Penalty Fund

Of the twenty-seven cases for which it has allocated funds, the CFPB has
published final data on its distributions of those funds for fifteen cases and initial
data on another five.74 In the twenty cases for which there is data,75 the CFPB
has distributed more than 905,000 checks totaling almost $447.5 million76 to

71. Cowie, supra note 1.
72. Q3 2019 CFO REPORT, supra note 61, at 6–9.
73. Because some cases had multiple final orders in different periods (i.e., orders resolving the claims
against different sets of defendants), each of which could allow allocations, for purposes of calculating the average number of cases with allocations in each period, this Article considered the allocation for a given case to
have happened in the period in which the first order became final when there were multiple final orders. There
were no cases with compensable harm in period eleven, and there also were no cases in period eight because the
two cases with final orders with compensable harm in period eight had final orders in prior periods. See 2018
FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 52, at 28; CFPB, FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
BUREAU: FISCAL YEAR 2017 35 (2017), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy17.pdf [https://perma.cc/4THJ-Z3D7 ] [hereinafter “2017 FINANCIAL REPORT”].
74. One of these five has been completed, but the CFPB had not published the final distribution data as of
the writing of this Article.
75. For purposes of analyzing the amounts distributed, this Article combines the final data and the initial
data on the distributions. The CFPB publishes data on its distributions from the Civil Penalty Fund only in its
annual fiscal year reports. Historically, there has been very little change between the CFPB’s initial reporting and
its final reporting on distributions. There have been twelve instances for which the CFPB has reported both initial
and final data on distributions. In eleven of those twelve, no additional money was distributed between the reports, and in the twelfth, the additional funds distributed represented only a 7.89% increase over the initial report.
Similarly, in seven of the twelve cases, no additional checks were sent between the initial and final reports, and
only forty-two additional checks were sent in total in the remaining five cases, which represented an increase of
only 0.01%.
76. In most cases the amount distributed is very close to the amount allocated. In fourteen of the twenty
cases (70%), the amount distributed was at least 95% of the amount allocated, and in a fifteenth case the amount
distributed was 94% of the amount allocated. In four of the cases, however, the amount distributed was at least
$1 million less than the amount allocated, and all told, the CFPB allocated $480.2 million to consumers harmed
in the twenty cases, and sent checks to consumers totaling 93% of that amount, or $447.5 million, meaning that
$32.8 million was allocated but not distributed. In at least some cases, this difference is the result of overestimating the harm during the allocation process. See 2017 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 35 n.8 (noting that
the initial harm in the Morgan Drexen matter was overstated by $500,000). In others, it may be that the CFPB
could not identify harmed consumers with enough specificity to provide reimbursement. See 2018 Financial Report, supra note 52, at 30 (noting that $15 million was unallocated from the Morgan Drexen matter “upon further
assessment of available victim data and funding needs”). The $17.6 million difference in the Morgan Drexen
matter alone accounted more than half of the total difference between the amounts initially allocated and the
amounts ultimately distributed.
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consumers harmed by the unlawful actions of the defendants in CFPB enforcement actions.77
As the average check amounts78 in the tables below demonstrate, payments
from the Fund are not insubstantial.79 They represent significant losses for consumers. The mean of the average check amounts for all of the cases is $2,329
and the median is $1,322.80 In other words, in more than half of the cases, the
average check amount was $1,322 or greater.81 Just over two thirds of the cases
(fourteen of twenty or 70%) have average check amounts of $1,000 or more, and
more than 177,000 checks82—totaling $391.8 million—were sent to consumers
harmed in these cases.
There is considerable variation among the average check amounts in each
case. Slightly more than half of the cases (twelve of twenty or 60%) have average
check amounts between $1,000 and $5,000 (inclusive), with the averages in a
cluster of cases (eight of the twenty or 40%) falling between $1,000 and $2,000
(inclusive).83 Only six cases had averages below $1,000, and they respectively
had averages of $891, $391, $210, $93, $41, and $27.84 Thus, even the cases with
77. The figures in this section include only the amounts distributed through the Civil Penalty Fund. In a
number of cases, the CFPB also provided Bureau-administered redress to the same consumers. Although the
money is going to the same consumers, it is coming from different sources, and likely in separate checks, in the
two instances. In some cases, a defendant pays some amount of redress to the CFPB as well as paying a civil
money penalty. In those cases, the amounts paid as redress are sent to consumers as Bureau-administered redress,
and any remaining compensable, uncompensated harm is paid through the Civil Penalty Fund. See, e.g., 2017
FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 41, 44 (reporting that approximately $3 million was distributed from the
Civil Penalty Fund to consumers harmed in the 3D Resorts-Bluegrass matter and approximately $100,000 in
Bureau-administered redress). Compare 2017 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 43–44 nn.13–14, 16 (noting
cases in which a single class of victims was compensated through both the Civil Penalty Fund and Bureauadministered redress) with 2017 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 44 n.15 (noting a case in which there were
two classes of harmed consumers, one of which was compensated through the Civil Penalty Fund and another
that was compensated through Bureau-administered redress).
78. By dividing the amount distributed by the number of checks sent, one can derive an average check
amount for a given case or for all of the cases combined. To the extent that the CFPB sent multiple checks to
some individuals (e.g., to replace the original checks sent to those individuals or to send additional monies to a
given individual) and has included those additional checks in its reports of the total number of checks sent, the
average check amount herein will be a conservative estimate of the average amount actually sent to consumers.
Any check reissues will artificially lower the average amount actually sent. For example, if two consumers each
received $100 from the fund, but one consumer needed the check to be reissued, there would be 3 checks sent,
resulting in an average of $67 rather than the true average of $100. See discussion infra Section III.C. and notes
90–91.
79. See infra Table 2.
80. See Cowie, supra note 1.
81. If one divides the overall amount distributed by the total number of checks sent, the average check
amount overall is $494. This average, however, masks both the fact that almost 75% of the cases have averages
higher than this amount and the fact that 80% of the checks sent were sent in cases with average check amounts
below this amount.
82. The CFPB publishes only the number of checks sent, not the number of consumers who received or
cashed the checks. The CFPB appears to have sent multiple checks to at least some individual consumers. See
discussion supra note 78; see also discussion infra Section III.C. and notes 90–91.
83. See infra Table 2.
84. The smallest average ($27) was in Amerisave Mortg. Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0010 (Aug. 12,
2014). The Amerisave matter is unusual. Amerisave paid approximately $20.9 million to the CFPB as part of its
consent order with the CFPB, roughly $14.9 million in redress and another $6 million in civil money penalties.
Id. at 27, 29; 2016 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 37–38, 46, 50. The CFPB sent harmed consumers 50,061
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smaller averages still had average amounts that likely would be significant to
consumers.85
TABLE 2: AVERAGE CHECK AMOUNTS BY CASE
Average Check Amount
Greater
Less Than
than or
Equal to
$10,000
$1,000
$10,000
$100
$1,000
$75
$100
$50
$75
$25
$50
$0
$25

Total

Number of
Cases
1
13
3
1
0
2
0

20

Average Check Amount
Greater
Less Than
than or
Equal to
$9,000
$10,000
$8,000
$9,000
$7,000
$8,000
$6,000
$7,000
$5,000
$6,000
$4,000
$5,000
$3,000
$4,000
$2,000
$3,000
$1,000
$2,000
Total

Number
of Cases
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
2
8
13

Furthermore, as the tables below demonstrate, the vast majority (88%) of
money distributed from the Fund has gone to consumers harmed in cases where
the average check amount is at least $1,000.86 If one considers the checks sent in
cases where the average check amount was at least $100, the number of checks
sent increases to almost 292,000,87 and those checks total almost $418 million,
accounting for 93% of the total amount distributed.88
The below tables group the checks sent in each case based on the average
check amount for that case. Each row represents a range of average check amount
values. For each range, the table shows how many checks were sent in the cases
with average check amounts within the range and the total value of those checks.
For each range, the table also shows the percentage of the total number of checks
sent and the percentage of the total value of all checks sent that were sent in cases
where the average check amount fell within the specified range.

checks totaling $1,366,268 from the Fund, and sent another 96,780 checks averaging $150 to pay the redress to
consumers. It is the only case in which funds were allocated from the Civil Penalty Fund and the defendants paid
more to the CFPB in total than the amount of harm they caused to consumers. Indeed, it is the only case in which
the Fund was used wherein the amounts actually paid by the defendants to the CFPB exceeded the amount of
compensable, uncompensated harm. See also discussion infra notes 195, 197, 217.
85. See discussion infra Section III.D (noting that even the two cases with the lowest averages still had
rates of cashing of 63% and the others had higher rates); Section IV.B (noting comparisons with consumer returns
in other types of actions).
86. See infra Table 3.
87. 291,928 to be exact. See infra Table 6.
88. See infra Table 3.
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TABLE 3: CHECKS MAILED IN CASES WITH AVERAGE CHECK AMOUNTS IN
SPECIFIED RANGES
Range of the Average
Check Amounts
Greater
than or
Equal to

Less Than

$10,000
$5,000
$1,000
$100
$75
$50
$25
$0

Percentage
of the Total
Number of
Checks Sent
Represented
by Checks
Sent in Each
Range
0%
0%
19%
13%
11%
57%
-

Number
of Checks
Sent in
Each
Range
239
1,331
175,495
114,863
99,338
513,806
905,072

$10,000
$5,000
$1,000
$100
$75
$50
$25
Total

Total Value of
All Checks Sent
In Each Range

$2,983,646
$10,599,805
$378,258,621
$26,136,444
$9,243,731
$20,268,714
$447,490,961

Percentage
of Total
Amount
Sent Represented by
Checks Sent
in Each
Range
1%
2%
85%
6%
2%
5%
-

TABLE 4
Range of the
Average Check
Amounts

Greater
than or
Equal
to

$4,000
$3,000
$2,000
$1,000

Less
Than

Number
of
Cases in
Each
Range

$5,000
$4,000
$3,000
$2,000
Total

1
1
2
8
12

Number of
Checks Sent
in Each
Range

Percentage
of the Total Number
of Checks
Sent Represented
by Checks
Sent in
Each
Range

Total Value
of All Checks
Sent In Each
Range

20,485
5,394
4,320
145,296
175,495

2%
1%
0%
16%
19%

$90,212,602
$18,331,734
$11,385,587
$258,328,698
$378,258,621

Percentage of
Total
Amount
Sent Represented
by
Checks
Sent in
Each
Range
20%
4%
3%
58%
85%

Because the CFPB does not publish information on the number of consumers who have received checks or the amounts that any individual consumers received, it is not possible to state exactly how many consumers received distributions from the Civil Penalty Fund. Given that the CFPB already has sent more
than 905,000 checks to consumers, however, the number of consumers receiving
checks seems likely to be in the hundreds of thousands.89 It appears that at least
in some cases, the CFPB has re-sent checks to given individuals. There were
three cases in which additional checks were sent after the initial report on the
89.

See supra Table 3.
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distributions, but the amount distributed did not increase.90 In addition, numerous CFPB memos on the distributions refer to re-issuing checks, suggesting that
at least some checks were reissued.91 Even if every consumer received two
checks, which seems extremely unlikely, it would mean more than 450,000 consumers received checks.
Nonetheless, what can be shown from the data is that the CFPB distributed
most of the money (85%) in the 175,495 checks totaling $378.3 million that were
sent to consumers harmed in cases where the average check amount was between
$1,000 and $5,000 and that 145,296 of those checks, totaling $258.3 million,
were sent to consumers harmed in the cluster of cases where the average check
amount was between $1,000 and $2,000.92
Relatively few checks (just over 1,500) were sent in the two cases where
the average check amount was greater than $5,000, and those two cases had unusual characteristics that caused large amounts of harm per consumer.93 Only
239 checks were sent in the 3D Resorts-Bluegrass matter—a matter involving
the sale of real property and violations of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act94—where the average check amount was more than $12,000.95 The Bureau also sent 1,331 checks in the Hoffman Law Group matter, where the average
check amount was $7,964. In that case, the court found that the defendants
charged very high, unlawful initial fees (typically $6,000) as well as other unlawful fees.96
In addition, a relatively small portion (5%) of the total amount distributed
was sent to consumers harmed in the two cases with the lowest averages, $41 in
Union Workers Credit Service97 and $27 in Amerisave.98 Although the CFPB
sent $20.3 million to the consumers in these two cases, it also sent more than
510,000 checks, resulting in relatively low average check amounts in each case.
Most of these checks (463,745) were sent in the Union Workers Credit Service

90. Compare 2016 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 46–47 (initial report on distributions for (Gordon
and National Corrective Group), and 2017 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 40 (initial report on distribution
for Hoffman Law Group), with 2017 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 41 (final report on distribution for
National Corrective Group), and 2018 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 52, at 29–30 (final report on distributions
for Gordon and Hoffman Law Group).
91. See, e.g., CFPB, In the Matter of Student Aid Institute, Inc—File No. 2016-CFPB-0008, https://files.
consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_Student-Aid-Institute.pdf (last visited May 13, 2021) [https://perma.
cc/E93F-2F3M] (“This matter is now closed. Payments and check reissue requests are no longer being honored.”).
92. See supra Table 4.
93. See supra Table 3.
94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1720.
95. 3D Resorts-Bluegrass, LLC, CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0002, 3–6, 11 (Dec. 3, 2013) (finding that defendants materially misrepresented the value of property sold as part of a resort); see also discussion infra note 125.
96. Default Judgment and Order as to Corporate Defendants at 6, CFPB v. Harper, No. 9:14-cv-80931
(S.D. Fla. May 28, 2015) [hereinafter Hoffman Law Group matter].
97. See generally Stipulated Final Judgment, CFPB v. Union Workers Credit Servs., No. 3:14-cv-04410
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2015).
98. See generally Amerisave Mortg. Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0010 (Aug. 12, 2014).
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case.99 That case was a relatively straightforward fraud where the defendants
allegedly lied to consumers by falsely telling them they would receive a generalpurpose credit card (similar to a MasterCard or Visa) if they paid a membership
fee (either $37 or $95), but the defendants took the relatively small membership
fee from hundreds of thousands of consumers.100 As is discussed below, the Amerisave matter also was unusual in that the defendants caused much more harm
than the $1.4 million paid from the Civil Penalty Fund, but the defendants paid
for most of the remediation of harm through Bureau-administered redress.101
Because the CFPB sent so many checks in these two cases with relatively
low average amounts, these checks pull the overall average check amount—determined simply by dividing the total amount distributed by the total number of
checks sent—down to $494. If the checks sent in these two cases are excluded
from the totals, the overall average increases to $1,092—in the range with the
cluster of eight cases that accounted for 58% of the total amount distributed.
D.

Consumers Have Cashed 87% of the Amounts Distributed and That
Percentage Is Likely To Increase

The CFPB’s distributions are very effective at getting money back into consumers’ pockets to compensate them for money taken illegally by defendants.
The published data102 indicate that consumers actually cash an extremely high
percentage of the funds distributed. In just over half of the cases, consumers
cashed 90% or more of the funds distributed, and overall, consumers cashed
87%—$192.4 million—of the $220.7 million distributed in these fifteen
cases.103 And the two lowest cashing rates are still 63%.104

99. CFPB, FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU – FISCAL YEAR 2016,
at 46 (2016), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/112016_cfpb_Final_Financial_Report_FY_
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/9V7B-47LK].
100. Complaint at 3, Union Workers Credit Servs., Inc., No. 3:14-cv-04410.
101. See discussion infra notes 195, 197; see also discussion supra notes 84, 85.
102. Although the CFPB has completed sixteen distributions, it has published data on the percentage of
funds distributed that were cashed (the “rate of cashing”) only for fifteen of the cases as of the writing of this
Article. See generally 2018 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 52.
103. See infra Tables 5, 9.
104. See infra Table 5, Graph 2.
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TABLE 5
Matter Name
3D Resorts-Bluegrass, LLC
Hoffman Law Group
National Legal Help Center
Gordon
Global Client Solutions, LLC
IrvineWebWorks Inc.
American Debt Settlement Solutions
Meracord LLC
Colfax Capital Corp.
Student Aid Institute, Inc.
Payday Loan Debt Solution, Inc.
National Corrective Group, Inc.
Student Financial Aid Services
Union Workers Credit Services, Inc.
Amerisave Mortgage Corp.

Average Check
Amount
$ 12,483.87
$ 7,963.79
$ 2,657.40
$ 2,632.50
$ 1,804.81
$ 1,650.73
$ 1,472.70
$ 1,166.44
$ 1,104.38
$ 1,073.39
$ 390.57
$ 209.59
$
93.05
$
40.76
$
27.29

Percentage of Distribution Cashed
97%
95%
93%
91%
92%
96%
97%
90%
71%
85%
86%
79%
79%
63%
63%

GRAPH 2

Furthermore, as the tables above demonstrate, the rate of cashing tends to
increase as the average check amount increases.105 Therefore, the overall rate of
105. See supra Table 5. The FTC also has noted a statistically relevant relationship between check cashing
rates and median check amounts. FTC, CONSUMERS AND CLASS ACTIONS: A RETROSPECTIVE AND ANALYSIS OF
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cashing is likely to increase for two reasons. First, of the five remaining cases
where the distributions are complete but the rates of cashing have not been published, four have average check amounts above $1,000—which have typically
had rates of cashing at 90% or higher106—and the fifth has an average check
amount of $891.107 Second, in those remaining five cases, the CFPB sent $226.7
million in checks to consumers, more than the total distributed in the fifteen published cases.108 Assuming that those cases have rates of cashing comparable to
the rates of published cases with similar average check amounts, one would expect the overall rate of cashing to rise to 90% or higher once the data on those
five cases is published.
IV. THE FUND EFFICIENTLY PROVIDES SIGNIFICANT REDRESS TO CONSUMERS
WHO LOST MONEY AND OTHERWISE WOULD RECEIVE LITTLE TO NO RELIEF
A.
1.

The CFPB Uses the Fund To Repay Consumers Money That Defendants
Took From Them Unlawfully
The Fund Is Used To Return Unlawful Fees to Consumers

The CFPB has used the Fund primarily to return fees that defendants took
from consumers illegally. These fees break down into roughly two categories:
(1) fees that were by themselves unlawful or (2) fees for goods or services where
the defendants deceived the consumers as to either the cost or the goods and
services that would be provided. All but one of the cases where the CFPB allocated funds to consumers fell into one of these two categories.109 In most cases,
the defendants both collected unlawful fees and deceived consumers about the
cost or the services that would be provided.110

SETTLEMENT CAMPAIGNS 12 (2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/consumers-class-actions-retrospective-analysis-settlement-campaigns/class_action_fairness_report_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/X46EZ6JM] [hereinafter “2019 FTC CLASS ACTION REPORT”].
106. See supra Table 5. Eight of the ten cases with average check amounts above $1,000 had a cashing rate
of 90% or higher. The two exceptions are Colfax Capital, in which the rate was only 71%, and Student Aid
Institute, with 85%. The four remaining cases with average check amounts above $1,000 have average check
amounts of $4,403.84, $3,398.54, $1,945.04, and $1,171.02.
107. See Cowie, supra note 1.
108. Of the five cases for which cashing rates had not been published as of the writing of this Article, the
four cases where the average check amount is above $1,000 represented $224.3 million of the $226.7 million in
outstanding checks.
109. The lone case that did not fall into one of these two categories also involved deceptive conduct: the
defendants sent letters on government letterhead, threatened consumers that they would be sent to jail unless they
paid their debts, and falsely stated that consumers had to enroll in defendants’ classes in order to avoid prosecution. Complaint at 6, 9–13, 17–20, 22–23, CFPB v. Nat’l Corrective Grp., No. 15-cv-00899-RDB (D. Md. Mar.
30, 2015). These statements and threats were deceptive under both Dodd-Frank, 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(B), and
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(3)–(5), 1692e(9)–(10). See id. at 17–20, 22–
23.
110. Defendants in nineteen of the twenty-seven cases allocated (seventy percent) did both. See infra text
accompanying notes 120–25.
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In more than 80% of the cases, the defendants took unlawful fees.111 Most
of these cases involved defendants taking fees that were unlawful because the
defendants had not yet provided the services as required by law.112 So-called
advance fees are illegal in a number of contexts, including, inter alia, debt-relief
and credit-repair services sold through telemarketing.113 Collecting these fees
before providing the services is illegal because these companies often promised
results, collected fees, and then failed to deliver the services or achieve the promised results.114 Seventy percent of the cases that received allocations (nineteen
of the twenty-seven) involved unlawful advance fees, primarily in debt-relief
cases.115 Another three cases (11% of the total cases that have received allocations) involved defendants charging consumers more than either the defendants
had disclosed or more than the consumers owed.116
In these cases, by law, defendants simply were not allowed to collect these
fees.117 Returning the money to consumers directly corrects the harms caused by
the defendants’ unlawful acts. Some might argue that these consumers are receiving windfalls because they received some services. This argument, however,
misses the mark. Based on a history of scams in the provision of these types of
services, the law requires these defendants to perform the services before they
can charge consumers, and the services had to have provided benefit to the consumers.118 If the defendants ultimately did provide the services such that they

111. See Cowie, supra note 1.
112. E.g., 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(2), (a)(5)(i) (2020) (prohibiting advance fees for debt-relief and creditrepair services sold through telemarketing).
113. § 310.4(a)(4).
114. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 48,458, 48,463 (Aug. 10, 2010) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310)
(discussing concerns with debt-relief services); Telemarketing Sales Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,842, 43,853–54 (Aug.
23, 1995) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310) (discussing concerns with credit-repair services).
115. Fourteen of the nineteen cases involved unlawful advance fees for debt-relief services, in violation of
either the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR), 16 C.F.R. pt. 310, or Regulation O, 12 C.F.R. pt. 1015, which was
formally known as the Mortgage Assistance Relief Services Rule (“MARS Rule”) and formerly codified at 16
C.F.R. pt. 322. Nine of those fourteen cases involved defendants taking advance fees for debt-relief services in
violation of the TSR, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(5)(i). The other five cases involved defendants who violated Regulation O, 12 C.F.R. § 1015.5(a), by taking advance fees for debt-relief services in the context of providing mortgage
relief assistance services. Three of the nineteen cases involved defendants collecting advance fees for creditrepair services in violation of the TSR, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(2). Two of the nineteen cases involved defendants
substantially assisting others in the collection of unlawful advance fees in violation of the TSR, 16 C.F.R.
§ 310.3(b). The nineteenth case involved a defendant charging fees prior to providing a good-faith estimate in
violation of Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 1026.19(a)(1)(ii), and Regulation X, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.7(a)(4). All told
thirteen of the nineteen cases involved unlawful advance fees in violation of the TSR. One case involved unlawful
advance fees for both credit-repair and debt-relief services.
116. These cases primarily involved violations of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601(1)–114,
and/or its implementing regulation, Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026. In one case, the defendants violated 15
U.S.C. §§ 1631(b), 1638(a)(3), and 12 C.F.R. §§ 1026.17(c)(1), 1026.18(d). In another, the defendants violated
15 U.S.C. §§ 1631(a), 1638(b), 12 C.F.R. §§ 1026.17(a)–(b), 1026.18, as well as the prohibitions on deceptive
acts or practices in Dodd-Frank, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(a), (c)(1), (d)(2)(A), and 5536(a)(1)(B). And in the last, the
defendants violated 12 C.F.R. §§ 1026.6(b)(2) and 1026.14.
117. E.g., 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(2), (a)(5)(i).
118. See, e.g., § 310.4(a)(2) (prohibiting sellers from requesting or receiving payment for credit-repair services until, inter alia, they have provided consumers with documentation “that the promised results have been
achieved”); § 310(a)(5)(i) (prohibiting sellers from requesting or receiving payment for “any debt relief service
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would be entitled to collect fees, the consumers might have no—or de minimis—
compensable harm from the unlawfully early collection. Absent proof that the
defendants ultimately complied with the law’s requirements, however, the consumers owed nothing. Giving the consumers their money back is a substantial
step toward putting the consumers back in the position the law intended.119
Eighty-five percent of the cases (twenty-three of twenty-seven) that have
received allocations involved defendants deceiving consumers as to either the
cost of the services or the types of services that would be provided.120 In these
cases, the CFPB often pleaded deception under both the Dodd-Frank Act121 as
well as another consumer law statute.122 In eleven cases, the defendants deceived
the consumers as to the cost of the services;123 in seventeen, as to the services
that would be provided,124 and in five, as to both.125
In both types of cases, defendants deceived consumers to get them to agree
to purchase the goods or services. The correct remedy for what is, in essence,
fraudulent inducement is to return the consumers’ money.126 Even assuming that
consumers received goods or services with some value, “the central issue here is
whether the seller’s misrepresentations tainted the customer’s purchasing decisions.”127 In rejecting the defendant’s argument that redress for such deception
should be reduced by the value of the goods received, the Ninth Circuit used the
example of a consumer who was sold rhinestones that were marketed as diamonds.128 “We would not limit their recovery to the difference between what
they paid and a fair price for rhinestones. The seller’s misrepresentations tainted
the customers’ purchasing decisions.”129 Thus, the “fraud in the selling, not the
value of the thing sold, is what entitles consumers in this case to full refunds or
until and unless . . . [t]he seller or telemarketer has renegotiated, settled, reduced, or otherwise altered the terms
of at least one debt pursuant to a . . . valid contractual agreement executed by the customer”).
119. Simply refunding the fees does not, of course, compensate consumers for lost time, the time value of
the money, and other harms.
120. See Cowie, supra note 1.
121. See 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(B).
122. E.g., Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 14–19, CFPB v. Com. Credit Consultants, No. 2:17-cv-4720 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2017) (alleging deception under the CFPA, 12 U.S.C. § 5536, and
under the Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 310.3(a)(1)(iii), (a)(2)(i), (a)(2)(iii)).
123. E.g., Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages at 9–13, CFPB v. Student Fin. Aid Serv., Inc., No.
2:15-at-00821 (E.D. Cal. July 23, 2015) (alleging that defendant misrepresented the total cost of its services and
failed to disclose truthfully a negative option feature of its services).
124. E.g., Complaint at 3, CFPB v. Union Workers Credit Servs., Inc., No. 3:14-cv-4410 (N.D. Tex. Dec.
17, 2014) (alleging that defendant falsely stated that consumers would get a general-use credit card—similar to
a Visa or MasterCard—if they purchased a membership).
125. E.g., Notice of Charges Seeking Rescission, Restitution, Civil Money Penalties, and Other Legal and
Equitable Relief at 10–23, In re 3D Resorts-Bluegrass, LLC, CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0002 (June 14, 2013) (alleging that defendant misrepresented the infrastructure and services that would be provided with the properties
for sale as well as the cost of some services).
126. See, e.g., McGregor v. Chierico, 206 F.3d 1378, 1388-89 (11th Cir. 2000) (affirming consumer redress
equivalent to the amount of gross sales because defendant had fraudulently induced customers “to accept and pay
for unordered” goods).
127. Id. at 1388.
128. FTC v. Figgie Int’l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 606 (9th Cir. 1993).
129. Id.
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to refunds for each [item] that is not useful to them.”130 A more limited remedy
would strip away the consumers’ ability to make their own purchasing decisions
and would force them into purchases that they would not have made but for defendants’ unlawful conduct. Thus, the default position in deception cases such as
these should be that the consumers get back all of the money they paid as a result
of the deception.
Moreover, in all but four of the cost-deception cases, the defendants also
collected unlawful advance fees, deceived consumers about the services to be
provided, or both.131 In 45% of the cost-deception cases, the defendants also
charged unlawful advance fees.132 To the extent that all of the monies defendants
illegally took from consumers were unlawful advance fees, consumers should
get all of those fees back, regardless of any services that may have been provided.
In 45%133 of the cost-deception cases, the defendants also deceived consumers
as to the goods or services that would be provided. Again, setting aside the deception as to the cost, the deception as to what would be provided vitiates the
consumers’ purchasing decisions, and the consumers should receive all of their
money back.
In the remaining four cases, the CFPB has taken a conservative approach
to defining harm.134 When consumers contracted for, and received, something of
significant value from the defendants (for example, a loan or real property), the
CFPB defined the harm as only undisclosed charges paid above the value of the
goods actually received and the charges the consumers agreed to pay for those
goods.135 In two of these cases, Triton Management and Colfax Capital, the defendants charged more for loans than they had disclosed to consumers, and the
CFPB gave consumers back any amounts they paid beyond the principal and
agreed-upon charges.136 In the third case, Student Financial Aid Services, the
defendants, inter alia, deceived consumers about the existence of recurring fees,
and the CFPB used the fund to return only fees paid for periods in which the

130. Id.; see e.g., Default Judgment and Order as to Corporate Defendants at 12–13, CFPB v. Harper, No.
9:14-cv-80931 (S.D. Fla. May 28, 2015) (holding defendants liable for the entire amount spent by consumers
because of the “fraud in the selling”).
131. Cowie, supra note 1.
132. Cowie, supra note 1.
133. Although there is some overlap between these two groups, the fact that they both happen to account
for 45% of the cost deception cases is a coincidence.
134. See e.g., Consent Order at 14, In re Colfax Capital Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0009 (July 29, 2014)
(ordering equitable monetary relief in the amount of finance charges consumers paid above the amounts of finance charges disclosed by defendants).
135. See, e.g., id.
136. Consent Order at 12, In re Triton Mgmt. Grp., Inc., CFPB No. 2018-BCFP-0005 (July 19, 2018) (ordering equitable monetary relief in the amount of consumer payments that exceed the finance charges disclosed
by defendants); In re Triton Management Group, Inc., File No. 2018-BCFP-0005 CFPB, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_triton-management-group.pdf (last visited May 13, 2021) [https://perma.cc/
8QPT-5XK2] (stating that defendants failed to disclose finance charges and that defendants must return unlawful
fees to consumers); Consent Order, supra note 134, at 14 (ordering equitable monetary relief in the amount of
finance charges consumers paid above the amounts of finance charges disclosed by defendants).
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defendants provided no services to the consumers.137 In the fourth case, Moseley,
the CFPB had not published information as of the writing of this Article on the
harm that will be remediated, but some consumers never authorized defendants’
loans, and those consumers should receive all of the finance charges they paid
back while those consumers who agreed to loans but were deceived as to the total
cost should receive only the finance charges they paid above the amounts that
they reasonably expected to pay.138
2.

The Structure of the Fund Helps Ensure That Only Actual Harm Is
Compensated

The Civil Penalty Fund Rule (the “Rule”)139 narrowly defines140 the
“harm” that may be remediated through the Fund in a way that reasonably prevents consumers from receiving windfalls. The Fund’s framework leaves little
space for gaming the system: an adjudicative authority either expressly orders
redress for the consumers’ harm in an amount certain or defines the amount of
that harm in some way, or the harm is limited to actual out-of-pocket losses
caused by the defendants’ unlawful conduct.141 Both methods provide certainty
as to the existence of the harm that might be remediated through the Fund. Further, however the harm is defined, a consumer may only receive compensation
from the Fund if the CFPB determines that the consumer is not reasonably expected to receive compensation from another source.142 As is discussed in detail
infra in Section IV.C, in most cases in which the Fund has been used, it is ex-

137. Stipulated Final Judgment and Order at 2, CFPB v. Student Fin. Aid Servs., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-01581
(Sept. 11, 2015) (defining affected consumers as those who purchased certain services and were charged in a
given year during which they did not use defendant’s services).
138. Stipulated Final Judgment and Order as to Defendants Richard F. Moseley, Sr., at 4, CFPB v. Moseley,
No. 4:14-cv-00789 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 10, 2018) (defining affected consumers as those affected by the violations
detailed in counts I through IV of the complaint); Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 18–
21, CFPB v. Moseley, No. 4:14-cv-00789 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 8, 2014) (alleging that defendants deceived consumers into believing that they authorized loans when they had not and therefore were obligated to pay the corresponding finance charges, deceived consumers as to the total finance charges for the loans, unfairly debited consumers’ bank accounts without authorization, and failed to disclose accurately the cost of the loans).
139. Civil Penalty Fund Rule, supra note 44; 12 C.F.R. pt. 1075 (2020).
140. Under the rule, the amount of harm is set by an order (or the method for calculating the harm is set by
an order), or the CFPB compensates only out-of-pocket losses. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.104(c). Non-monetary harm
(e.g., stress or time spent handling the results of a violation) are not out-of-pocket losses.
141. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.104(b)–(c).
142. Id. § 1075.104(b).
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tremely unlikely that consumers could receive relief from private litigation following the CFPB enforcement action.143 Thus, the requirements of the Civil Penalty Fund Rule make it reasonably unlikely that any consumers will receive
windfalls from the Fund.144
The Rule limits payments to situations in which three criteria are met: the
consumers must be eligible victims; they must have compensable harm; and
some amount of that harm must be uncompensated. First, consumers are eligible
victims—who therefore may receive payments from the fund—only if they have
been harmed by a violation for which a final order145 in a Bureau enforcement
action146 imposes a civil penalty.147 Thus, if a final order does not require a defendant148 to pay a civil money penalty, the consumers harmed by that defendant
cannot receive payments from the fund regardless of the amount of harm they
have suffered.
Second, the consumers’ harm must be “compensable” under the rule.149
The rule establishes a hierarchical framework for determining whether there is
compensable harm.150 Court orders regarding the amount of harm control.151 If
an order does not specify the amount of the harm, each consumer’s compensable
harm is his or her out-of-pocket losses from the violation for which the penalty
was imposed if those losses are practicable to determine.152

143. Although it does not appear to have happened frequently with the CFPB, when federal agencies bring
enforcement actions while there is ongoing private litigation, they often have coordinated with the private actions
in the provision of relief, thereby ensuring that there are no double recoveries. See, e.g., Stipulated Order for
Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 35–41, CFPB v. Equifax, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-3300 (N.D. Ga. July
23, 2019); Velikonja, supra note 54, at 387–88 (noting that where there are overlapping actions, the SEC “usually
coordinates the distribution of collected funds with parallel proceedings,” for example in cases with parallel class
actions or criminal proceedings); Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief
at 8–14, FTC v. Airborne Health, Inc., No. 08-05300 (Aug. 13, 2008) (entering judgment against defendants for
$30 million but coordinating the provision of relief to consumers with a private class action).
144. Indeed, if anything, this conservative approach often will undercompensate consumers by excluding
harm that is hard to quantify (e.g., the value of lost time, the time-value of money, the costs of significant emotional distress).
145. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.101 (defining “Final order” as “a consent order or settlement issued by a court or by
the Bureau, or an appealable order issued by a court or by the Bureau as to which the time for filing an appeal
has expired and no appeals are pending”).
146. Id. (defining “Bureau enforcement action” to include both administrative actions or proceedings as
well as actions in court wherein the Bureau has “obtained relief with respect to a violation”).
147. § 1075.103.
148. The Civil Penalty Fund Rule defines “defendant” to include parties “found or alleged to have committed a violation” in both court and administrative adjudications). 12 C.F.R. § 1075.101.
149. § 1075.104(a)–(c) (2020) (providing that the fund will be used to compensate eligible victims’ uncompensated harm, that “uncompensated harm” is equal to a victim’s compensable harm minus any payments reasonably expected or received, and defining the framework for determining “compensable” harm).
150. See § 1075.104(c). This includes orders denying redress, setting an amount of harm for an entire class,
or establishing a method for calculating the harm. Id. If the order suspends or waives part of the redress ordered,
it does not alter or reduce the amount of compensable harm. § 1075.104(c)(1).
151. § 1075.104(c)(2)(i).
152. § 1075.104(c)(2)(iii). Although the CFPB does not release much data on how it calculates the harm in
a given case (beyond what is in the relevant orders), the CFPB generally appears to be determining harm by
looking at the defendants’ and other related entities’ records of consumers’ payments, rather than by creating a
claims process where consumers would submit supporting documents. It has used claims processes in a few

COWIE (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1444

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

9/13/21 9:29 PM

[Vol. 2021

Third, the fund only makes payments for the uncompensated harm of eligible consumers.153 Uncompensated harm is defined as compensable harm minus
any compensation the consumer has received for that harm or is reasonably expected to receive for that harm.154 The rule lays out several instances in which
the consumer will have received other compensation for the harm: previous payments from the Civil Penalty Fund to the same class of victims; redress ordered
in a Bureau enforcement action that has not been suspended, waived, or determined to be uncollectible; and any other redress that the Bureau knows has either
been paid or has been paid to an intermediary for distribution to victims and that
compensates the consumer for the same harm.155 If it is unduly burdensome,
given the amounts at stake, to determine either the amount of redress that is, or
will be, paid by another entity or the extent to which that redress compensates
consumers for the same harm, the Bureau may exclude that redress from the
compensation that the victim is expected to receive.156
B.

Consumers Likely Find Payments from the Fund to Be Significant

The CFPB’s payments from the Fund likely are significant to average consumers. For context, the Federal Reserve Board surveyed approximately 12,000
individuals in 2019.157 Nearly 37% of people surveyed stated that they would
have difficulty covering a $400 unexpected expense.158 Further, “[n]early 3 in
10 adults were either unable to pay their monthly bills or were one modest financial setback away from failing to pay monthly bills in full.”159 Overall, 25% of
adults had family incomes that were less than $25,000, and 37% had family incomes of less than $40,000.160 Those family incomes translate into average
monthly incomes of $2,083 or less and $3,333 or less.
As is discussed in detail in Section III.C above, the CFPB has sent hundreds
of thousands of checks to consumers where the average check amounts were approximately $100 or more.161 Indeed, more than 177,000 checks were sent to
consumers in cases where the average check amount was more than $1,000.162
If one includes checks in cases where the average check amount is more than
cases, though. See, e.g., Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 35–41, CFPB v.
Equifax Inc., No. 1:19-cv-3300-TWT, (N.D. Ga. July 23, 2019).
153. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.104(a)–(b).
154. § 1075.104(b).
155. § 1075.104(b)(2); cf. Velikonja, supra note 54, at 364–65 (noting that the SEC takes into account related actions when determining how much to pay investors from fair funds and refuses to pay more than necessary
to compensate investors for “the full extent of their losses”).
156. § 1075.104(b)(2).
157. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF U.S.
HOUSEHOLDS IN 2019, at 1 n.1 (2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2019-report-economicwell-being-us-households-202005.pdf [https://perma.cc/V68D-8HD2]; see also id. at 57–59 (describing the survey methodology).
158. Id. at 21.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 11.
161. See supra Section III.C and accompanying text.
162. See supra Section III.C and accompanying notes; see also infra Table 7.
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$100, that number increases to more than 291,000, and if one includes the single
case with an average check amount of $93.05, the number of checks sent increases to just over 391,000.163
TABLE 6
Average Check Amount Is
Greater Than:164
$1,000
$100
$90

Number of Checks Sent to
Consumers165
177,065
291,928
391,266

These average check amounts—involving checks totaling $427.2 million
for these eighteen cases—are significant by any measure.166 Moreover, as noted
above, many cases involved unlawful fees for debt-relief or credit-repair services.167 Purchase of these services suggests that the consumers in question already were in some financial distress, making the return of these funds even more
significant.
Furthermore, the above groupings mask the fact that thousands of consumers are receiving checks with even higher average amounts. In cases in which the
average check amount was between $1,000 and $5,000, the CFPB sent more than
170,000 checks, and the average check amount for those cases was more than
$2,000.168 Another approximately 115,000 checks were sent in cases where the
average check amount was more than $200, and another almost 100,000 checks
were sent in a case with an average check amount of $93.169

163. The average check amount is $93.05 in the one case with an average check amount above $75, but
below $100. See supra Table 3; see also infra Table 6. The CFPB sent 99,338 checks in that case.
164. Because each row indicates the number of checks sent in cases where the average check amount is
greater than a specified amount, the number of checks in any given row includes all of the checks in the higher
rows as well.
165. As is discussed in supra Section III.C, the CFPB does not publish data on the number of consumers
who received or cashed checks.
166. Cowie, supra note 1.
167. See supra Section IV.A.1.
168. See infra Table 7.
169. See infra Table 7.
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TABLE 7
Range of the Average Check
Amounts
Greater than
or Equal to
$5,000
$1,000
$100
$90

Less Than

$5,000
$1,000
$100

Number of
Checks Sent to
Consumers in
Cases in this
Range
1,570
175,495
114,863
99,338

Average Check
Amount for
Cases in this
Range170
$8,652
$2,155
$228
$93

Even the average check amount in the two cases with the lowest average
check amounts171 is still significant. The CFPB sent more than 500,000 checks172
with an average check amount of $39 in these two cases.173 The fact that 63% of
the more than $20 million distributed by the CFPB in these two cases was cashed
by consumers is some indication that consumers felt that the amounts they were
receiving were significant, at least significant enough to go through the effort to
cash the checks.174
In addition, the average check amounts paid from the Civil Penalty Fund
compare very favorably to amounts paid to consumers for relief in similar situations. Over four years, 2016-2019, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) distributed checks to 9.9 million consumers averaging $101.175 By comparison, the
overall average check amount from the Civil Penalty Fund is $494.176 Similarly,
170. This average is a weighted average for all of the cases with average check amounts in each range. The
average for each range is calculated by summing the total amounts distributed in all of the cases in a given range
and dividing that figure by the sum of all of the checks sent in all of the cases in that range. For example, if four
checks were sent in a case with an average check amount of $100 and two checks were sent in a case with an
average check amount of $500, the average check amount in that range would be ((100*4)+(500*2))/(4+2) =
1,400/6 = $233. This weighted average is more informative than simply averaging the averages from the two
cases, which would be (100+500)/2 = $300. Unless stated otherwise, all of the averages in this section are calculated using a weighted average.
171. $41 and $27 respectively.
172. 513,806 to be exact. See supra Table 3.
173. Cowie, supra note 1; see also supra Table 3.
174. The question here is not whether consumers felt that this amount adequately compensated them for
their harm. It is impossible to infer their attitudes from this data. Rather, the question is whether they felt that this
amount was significant to them given their budget and other demands on their time. Assuming that the benefit
from cashing a check outweighs the costs of doing so, one would assume that an economically rational person
would cash the check. A person could decline to cash either because the amount was relatively insignificant in
the context of the person’s budget or because the costs of cashing the check (in time and fees) outweighed the
value of the check. For some consumers, especially poorer or unbanked consumers, the transaction costs to cash
the check could be higher than $41 or $27. The data here shows that despite the relatively low average check
amounts recipients of 63% of these distributions elected to cash the checks. Cowie, supra note 1; see also supra
Table 5.
175. FTC Refunds to Consumers: Calendar Year: 2016 to 2019, TABLEAU PUB., https://public.tableau.com/profile/federal.trade.commission#!/vizhome/Refunds_15797958402020/RefundsbyDate
[https://
perma.cc/R7HP-HYSS] (Jan. 5, 2021). This comparison is not perfect. The FTC refunds consumers’ money by
using money the FTC collected from the defendants in the same case, and thus, these amounts may not reflect
the total harm. Also, the types of cases enforced by the FTC and the CFPB are not identical; therefore the FTC
may provide refunds in cases that involve violations that the CFPB could not prosecute.
176. Cowie, supra note 1.
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for 2017 and 2018, most of the money distributed in the FTC’s initial distributions went to consumers in cases where the average refund177 was between $100
and $1,000.178 That range represented 66% of the total initial distributions, and
the average refund to all consumers from cases in that range was $401.179 By
contrast, 84% of the money distributed through the Civil Penalty Fund was sent
to consumers harmed in cases where the average check amount ranged between
$1,000 and $5,000, with the average check amount in that range being $2,155.180
As with the Civil Penalty Fund, the FTC also sent most consumers (86% of the
total) refunds in cases where the average refund was less than $50. Only 57% of
the Civil Penalty Fund checks, however, were sent in cases where the average
check amount was less than $50, and the funds distributed to those consumers
represented only 5% of the total funds distributed from the Civil Penalty Fund,
while 30% of the refunds provided by the FTC were in cases from this range.181
In addition, almost 15% of the FTC’s refunds were in cases whether the average
refund was less than $25.182
Cox, Widman, and Totten examined 128 state enforcement cases in which
consumers received compensation.183 These cases primarily provided relief to
consumers that were identified specifically in the orders, and typically involved
relatively few consumers (more than half involved less than ten consumers).184
In the forty-two cases in which consumers in a given case received the same
amounts, the average payment was $3,010 and the median $1,000.185 In the
eighty-six cases in which consumers received different amounts, the average
high and low payments were $6,030 and $648 respectively, and the median high
and low payments were $2,431 and $250 respectively.186 These numbers are not
directly comparable to the average check amounts from CFPB distributions, as
they do not include the mean or median for each case, but the CFPB issued thousands of checks in cases where the average check amounts were comparable.

177. In the 2017 FTC REFUND REPORT, the FTC reported the average refund for each case. FTC, OFFICE OF
CLAIMS AND REFUNDS ANNUAL REPORT 2017, at 3–4 (2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/bureau-consumer-protection-office-claims-refunds-annual-report-2017-consumer-refunds-effected-july/
redressreportformattedforweb122117.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Z5A-8DG5]. In the 2018 FTC REFUND REPORT, the
FTC reported only the median refunds for each case, but the average could be calculated by dividing the figures
provided for the amount mailed for each case and for the number of consumers, which mirrors the calculation of
the average in the 2017 FTC REFUND REPORT. Id.; OFF. CLAIMS AND REFUNDS, FTC, 2018 FTC ANNUAL REPORT
ON REFUNDS TO CONSUMERS 2018, at 3–4 (2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/2018-annual-report-refunds-consumers/annual_redress_report_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/VA65-ZVR4].
178. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
180. See supra Tables 3 & 7.
181. See supra Table 3.
182. Cowie, supra note 1.
183. Cox, supra note 2, at 78.
184. Id. (noting that the average number of consumers receiving relief was 125 and the median was eight
from 141 cases, although they could identify the amount of the payment only in 128 cases).
185. Id.
186. Id.
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As another example, the CFPB’s use of the Civil Penalty Fund compares
favorably to the relief consumers have received in class actions.187 The FTC conducted a study of relief provided to consumers through class actions.188 That
study found that the average compensation was $79 and the median compensation was $69, with one-quarter of the cases having a median of $22 and onequarter a median of $200 or more.189 The CFPB analyzed settlements in more
than 200190 class-action cases involving consumer financial products or services
and found that consumers received approximately $32.191
Both the FTC, the states, and class actions are limited in an important way
that the CFPB is not; they can only provide consumers with relief from the
money available from the defendants that specifically harmed them. When those
defendants do not have sufficient resources, consumers cannot receive full relief.
These situations are comparable to Bureau-administered relief, which also relies
solely on money collected from the defendants who caused the specific harm.
The Civil Penalty Fund squarely addresses this problem.

187. An analysis of the benefits and costs of private enforcement of consumer laws through class actions is
beyond the scope of this paper; however, it is worth noting that there undoubtedly is a significant amount of
unlawful conduct that is neither prosecuted by government regulators nor enforced through private actions (either
individual or class actions). In addition, in those instances in which a case is filed, most of the time there is either
a government enforcement action or a private action, but not both. CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO
CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT §1028(A) §§
1.3, 1.4.8, at 8, 17–18 (2015), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9CA-C2RJ] (noting that in its survey of 1,150 cases filed by enforcers, it was
not able to find a related private class action in 88% of the cases, and that in its survey of 114 private class actions,
it was not able to find a related government action 66% of the time). Thus, the point of this section is not to say
that these other types of cases do not reach appropriate resolutions, especially in the typical case where the alternative is no recovery at all for the consumers, but rather that the typical checks sent from the Civil Penalty Fund
are providing significant monetary relief to consumers.
188. 2019 FTC CLASS ACTION REPORT, supra note 105. As with the FTC comparison, the class action data
set included cases that the CFPB could not prosecute. See id. at 19 fig.3 (noting that data set included cases
involving product malfunction and anticompetitive conduct).
189. Id. at 21 tbl.2, 23 n.41.
190. The CFPB analyzed 419 cases in total, but not every case had sufficient detail to allow an analysis of
the relief consumers received. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 187, § 8.1, at 3 n.4.
191. Id. at 27; Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33,210, 33,234 n.335 (July 19, 2017) (disapproved
under the Congressional Review Act on Nov. 1, 2017, PL 115-74, and removed from the code of federal regulations on Nov. 22, 2017). Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 55,500, 55,500 (Nov. 22, 2017)) (noting that
although the two datasets in the CFPB Arbitration Study were not congruent, the CFPB “believes that this $32per-class-member recovery figure is a reasonable estimate”). The CFPB noted one multi-district litigation involving 18 settlements that provided $1 billion in monetary relief to 29 million consumers, which averages to
$34 per consumer. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 187, § 8, at 39–40.

COWIE (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 4]

C.

PUTTING MONEY BACK INTO CONSUMERS’ POCKETS

9/13/21 9:29 PM

1449

Absent the Existence of the Fund, These Consumers Likely Would Receive
Little or No Relief

A revolutionary aspect of the CFPB’s Civil Penalty Fund is that it can provide relief to consumers when the defendants who harmed those consumers do
not have enough money to make the consumers whole.192 It does so by using the
penalties paid by all defendants for violating consumer laws to provide relief to
consumers harmed by those defendants who do not have sufficient assets to provide relief themselves. Absent the relief provided through the Civil Penalty Fund,
the consumers in these cases likely would have received little or no relief.
1.

In Most Cases in Which the Fund Is Used, the CFPB, Rather than the
Defendants, Has Remediated the Vast Majority of the Consumers’ Harm

The defendants in the twenty-seven cases for which the CFPB has allocated
funds from the Civil Penalty Fund193 caused $706.2 million194 in harm to consumers—under the narrow definition of compensable, uncompensated harm in
the Civil Penalty Rule. But these defendants paid only $46 million of that
harm,195 or roughly seven cents for each dollar of harm they caused. Absent payments from the Fund, the consumers in these cases most likely would receive no
compensation for 93% of their harm, resulting in more than $660.2 million196 in
compensable but uncompensated harm.
Even these figures understate the amount of unremediated harm consumers
would have in a typical case if the Fund did not exist. As an initial matter, just
192. See, e.g., Brief for the CFPB as Amici Curiae supporting Respondents, Linton v. Consumer Prot. Div.,
225 A.3d 456 (Ct. App. Md. Nov. 6, 2019) (No. 2019-33) (“[T]he Fund is used principally to compensate consumers who were harmed by violations of Federal consumer financial law and who were not fully compensated
through the relevant [CFPB] enforcement action, often because the defendants lacked sufficient financial resources to fully remediate the harm they caused.”).
193. This analysis includes the cases resolved by March 31, 2019. See discussion supra Section III.A.
194. This amount includes $35 million in Bureau-administered redress paid to consumers and $671.2 million allocated from the Fund for payment to consumers. Defendants in a given case may be ordered to pay redress
to the CFPB, rather than paying redress directly to the consumers they harmed. When this happens, the CFPB
uses the funds to provide Bureau-administered redress to the consumers harmed by those specific defendants.
These payments are separate from payments from the Fund. None of the defendants in these 27 cases paid redress
directly to consumers, although thirteen paid redress to the CFPB in addition to paying civil money penalties.
The amount of Bureau-administered redress understates the actual amount of harm to consumers because in three
of the cases, the defendants have paid redress to the Bureau—and therefore their payments are included in the
$46 million that the defendants paid—but the CFPB had not published any data on its distribution of those monies
as of the writing of this Article—and therefore those payments are not included in the $35 million figure for
Bureau-administered redress (and thus are not included in the total harm). When that redress is known and included in the total harm, the percentage of harm remediated by defendants will decrease and the amount of unremediated harm will increase.
195. This figure includes both amounts paid as redress and as penalties. The defendant in only one of these
twenty-seven cases, Amerisave Mortgage Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0010 (Aug. 12, 2014), paid more to the
Bureau than the harm it caused. This figure and the subsequent percentages do not include the amount Amerisave
paid beyond the harm it caused, as doing so artificially decreases the unremediated harm in the remaining cases.
196. This analysis conservatively assumes that all of the money paid by defendants to the CFPB (including
both money paid for redress and civil money penalties) would have been paid directly to consumers with no
decreases due to administrative costs.
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one case accounts for roughly 35% of the total paid by defendants in all twentyseven cases.197
Additionally, in half of the cases, the defendants paid less than 1% of the
harm they caused.198 In six of those cases, the defendants paid $5 or less while
causing an average of $9.8 million in harm.199 The consumers in these six cases
would receive, effectively, no compensation for their harm without the Fund—
resulting in a total of $59 million in unremediated harm. In another seven cases,
the defendants paid more than $5 but less than 1% of the harm they caused,200
resulting in a total of $243.5 million in unremediated harm if the Fund were not
used. All told, in these thirteen cases, the defendants paid less than 0.3% of the
harm they caused, leaving a total of $302.5 million in harm to be covered by the
Fund.

197. Amerisave Mortgage Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0010 (Aug. 12, 2014). Amerisave is an unusual
case in many respects. First, it is the only case in which the Fund was used where the defendants paid more to
consumers than the CFPB did. Second, the defendants in that case are the only defendants who paid more in
redress and penalties than the amount of harm they caused (as calculated by the Civil Penalty Fund Rule). The
Amerisave defendants paid $14.9 million to the CFPB for redress and another $6 million in civil money penalties
(roughly $20.9 million combined). Id. However, they caused $15.9 million in harm to consumers. Finally, the
average check amount in the distribution for this case was the lowest of all the cases. See supra Table 5. By
contrast, the average check amount for the Bureau-administered redress in Amerisave was $150. It is not clear
from the publicly available information why the CFPB allocated funds to the Amerisave matter rather than simply
ordering Amerisave to remediate consumers fully. Amerisave clearly had enough money to remediate consumers
completely itself. It paid $14.9 million in redress, and paid a civil money penalty that was higher than the amount
allocated from the Fund—the only instance in which that occurred. One possible explanation is that the CFPB
either underestimated the amount of harm when it structured the consent order or discovered additional harm
after the order had issued. The fact that the average check amount from the Bureau-administered redress was so
much higher than the average check paid from the Fund ($150 versus $27 respectively) suggests that the CFPB
found some additional harm after the settlement. Either way, because the amount of additional harm was lower
than the penalty paid, the defendants ultimately did cover the entire amount of harm themselves.
198. Harm is defined as the amount allocated from the Civil Penalty Fund plus any amounts paid to consumers as Bureau-administered redress. For these cases, those two amounts equal consumers’ compensable harm
as that term is defined in the Civil Penalty Fund Rule. This analysis and the analyses that follow are derived from
twenty-six of the twenty-seven cases. The analyses exclude Triton Mgmt. Grp., Inc., CFPB No. 2018-BCFP0005 (July 19, 2018). In that case, the defendants paid redress to the CFPB, but the CFPB had not yet reported
on how much it distributed in Bureau-administered redress to the consumers harmed in those cases. Although the
amount of redress paid by defendants to the CFPB is usually very close to the amount in Bureau-administered
redress ultimately paid by the CFPB to consumers, there have been differences, and in this case, a difference
could be significant. Assuming that the Bureau-administered redress roughly equaled the amount of redress Triton Management paid to the CFPB, Triton Management will have paid approximately 1/3 of the more than $1.5
million in harm it caused. Two other cases where the defendants had paid redress but the CFPB had not yet
reported on the amounts of Bureau-administered redress were included. In one, CFPB v. Moseley, No. 4:14-cv00789-SRB (W.D. Mo. Aug. 10, 2018), the CFPB received seized assets (ordered as redress to be paid to the
CFPB) after it already had allocated funds to the harmed consumers. Therefore, the seized amounts should not
increase the harm remediated. In the other, Bureau Cons. Fin. Prot. v. Howard, No. 8:17-cv-00161-JLS (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 27, 2019), the amount of redress paid by the defendants was de minimis compared with the amount of
harm caused ($50,000 in redress paid versus over $35 million in harm), such that it will not have a significant
impact on the analyses.
199. See infra Table 8.
200. See infra Table 8.
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In almost 70% of the cases, the defendants paid less than 5% of the harm
they caused.201 In addition to the cases from the prior paragraph, there were another five cases in which the defendants paid less than 5% (but more than 1%)
of the harm they caused.202 Absent the use of the Fund, the consumers in these
five cases would have had an additional $47.7 million in unremediated harm.
The defendants in these five cases collectively paid only 4% of the harm they
caused.
In seven of the remaining cases, the defendants paid more than 5% of the
harm they caused,203 but the Fund still provided vastly more relief to consumers
harmed in those cases than the defendants could have. Collectively, the defendants in these seven cases caused $336.2 million in harm, but the CFPB reimbursed consumers for more than 92% of that harm, while the defendants collectively paid less than 8%.204 In total, using the Fund, the CFPB allocated $309.5
million to consumers in relief beyond the amounts paid by the defendants in those
six cases, an average of almost $44.2 million covered by the Fund per case.
TABLE 8
Harm Covered by
Defendants in Each Case

Number
of Cases

Less than $5
Between $5 and 1%
Between 1% and 5%
More than 5%
100%

6
7
5
7
1
26

Total206

Total Unremediated
205
Harm
$59,000,000
$243,500,000
$47,700,000
$309,500,000
$0
$659,700,000

Average Unremediated Harm Per Case
$9,800,000
$34,800,000
$9,500,000
$44,200,000
$0

Thus, the defendants in most cases paid amounts that remediated little to
none of the harm they caused. Although, on average, the defendants in these
cases paid less than 7% of the harm they caused, the median amount of harm
covered by defendants in individual cases was less than 1%. Indeed, almost 70%
of defendants paid less than 5% of the harm they caused, and half paid less than
1%. Just under one-quarter paid less than $5, effectively zero.
2.

In Most Cases, the Defendants Had Limited Financial Resources or Were
Out of Business, and Consumers Likely Could Not Receive Compensation
From Any Other Source

In resolving enforcement actions, enforcers always should strive to require
defendants to remediate harmed consumers fully. In determining whether to settle a given case and the specific terms on which to settle, however, enforcers
201. See infra Table 8.
202. See infra Table 8.
203. See infra Table 8.
204. The percentages in these seven cases were 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 19, and 36% respectively.
205. Figures for both the totals and the averages are rounded to the nearest $100,000. See Table 4 n.4.
206. If Triton Management were included, the total unremediated harm likely would be approximately
$660.7 million for all twenty-seven cases. See discussion supra notes 136, 198.
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must balance a multitude of competing factors: What are the defendants’ financial resources? How many of those resources will be depleted by ongoing litigation costs? Even if the enforcer ultimately wins, how many of those resources
will be recoverable by the enforcer? How much additional delay in providing
relief to consumers will be caused by continuing litigation? How much harm will
that delay cause? How much new harm will the defendants’ illegal practices
cause—both to new and existing consumers—while the litigation is ongoing?
How much harm will other market actors cause through similar actions before
the resolution becomes public? What are the risks of ultimately losing the litigation? In fact, the CFPB is required by statute to consider “the size of financial
resources” of the defendants in determining the amount of any civil money penalty.207 While ordering defendants to remediate all harmed consumers fully is
obviously the ideal, and one the CFPB has achieved much of the time,208 in practice, that result is not always feasible.
In most of the cases (eighteen of twenty-seven) where funds were allocated
from the Civil Penalty Fund, the information available in the relevant orders suggests that the defendants did not have sufficient resources to remediate the hundreds of millions of dollars in harm they caused consumers.209 In eleven of the
twenty-seven cases, the orders either expressly determined that the defendants
had an inability to pay or set the amounts ordered to be paid based on the defendants’ sworn representations regarding their limited financial resources.210 In another five cases, the defendants either were in bankruptcy or were ordered to
cease operations completely.211 In another two cases, the defendants defaulted.212
The defendants’ statuses in the remaining nine cases are not as clear from
the orders. Based on reviewing the defendants’ websites as well as state-government websites in states where the defendants were incorporated or operating, the
artificial-person defendants in five of the nine cases appear to be no longer operating.213 In addition, the defendants in each of these cases were enjoined from
participating in the relevant industry as a whole, rather than a simple injunction

207. 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c)(3)(A).
208. In 83% of the cases resolved prior to April 1, 2019, and where a civil money penalty was imposed, the
CFPB determined that there was no remaining compensable, uncompensated harm, and therefore, no funds
needed to be allocated from the Civil Penalty Fund. Again, it is important to recognize that remediating all harm,
as that term is defined in the Civil Penalty Fund Rule, does not necessarily mean that consumers will not have
other harm (e.g., stress, lost wages or opportunity costs from time spent responding to the unlawful conduct, etc.).
209. See, e.g., CFPB v. Michael Harper, No. 9:14-cv-80931 (S.D. Fla. May 5, 2015).
210. See, e.g., id. In one of these cases, an individual defendant also was sentenced to 120 months in jail
and ordered to forfeit $49 million. Stipulated Final Judgment and Order as to Defendants Richard F. Moseley,
Sr., et al., at 3, CFPB v. Moseley, No. 4:14-cv-00789 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 10, 2018).
211. Cowie, supra note 1.
212. Id.
213. Cowie, supra note 1. Based on this data, it is not possible to determine when the companies ceased
operating; thus it is possible that one or more of them continued to operate for a time after the resolution of the
CFPB enforcement action.
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against violating the law or collecting unlawful fees.214 As a result, those defendants lost access to a major—if not their sole—source of revenue.
Thus, in twenty-three of the twenty-seven cases (85%), the available information strongly suggests a lack of resources sufficient to remediate consumers
fully. Collectively the defendants in these cases paid $22.8 million but caused
$544.8 million in harm.215 Even if they could have paid significantly more than
they did—which appears unlikely given their resources and operating statuses—
it seems unlikely that they could have made up the almost $522 million216 in
remaining harm that will be remediated by the use of the Civil Penalty Fund.217
In addition, it is unlikely that the consumers harmed in these cases could
recover their damage from another source. First, the CFPB itself must determine
that the consumers are not reasonably expected to receive compensation before
it allocates any amount from the Fund.218 Second, given the demonstrated lack
of resources from most of these defendants, it seems extremely unlikely that any
individual, or even a class of individuals, could find private attorneys to bring an
action against these defendants after the resolution of the CFPB’s enforcement
action, especially if the order required the defendants to pay significant amounts
to the CFPB and to cease operations, as many orders do. Third, although the
average check amounts are significant to individual harmed consumers, in most
cases they do not seem high enough to justify an individual action even if the

214. In four cases, the defendants were permanently enjoined, and in the fifth the ban was for five years.
Stipulated Final Judgment and Order at 4, CFPB v. Prime Mktg. Holdings, LLC, No. 2:16-cv-07111 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 31, 2017) (permanently restraining defendant from, inter alia, “selling, assisting in the sale of, or administering Credit Repair Services” or receiving remuneration from another’s sale of such services); Stipulated Final
Judgment and Order at 4, CFPB v. Commercial Credit Consultants, No. 2:17-cv-4720 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2017)
(ordering a five-year ban on providing “Credit Repair Services”); Stipulated Final Judgment at 3, CFPB v. Union
Workers Credit Servs., Inc., No. 3:14-cv-4410 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2015) (permanently restraining defendant
from offering or profiting from the offering of credit); Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Permanent Injunction, Civil Money Penalties, and Other Relief at 5, CFPB v. College Educ. Servs. LLC, No. 8:14-cv-3078
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2015) (permanently restraining offering, or profiting from the offering of, “Debt-Relief Service”); Stipulated Final Judgment and Consent Order at 4, CFPB v. Meracord LLC, No. 3:13-cv-05871 (W.D.
Wash. Oct. 3, 2013), 2013 WL 5477618 (permanently enjoining defendants from providing payment-processing
services for providers of a “Debt Relief Service or a Mortgage Assistance Relief Service”).
215. Cowie, supra note 1.
216. Id. If one considers only the eighteen cases where the orders made clear the status of the defendants,
the defendants’ payments would have left $462.8 million in unremediated harm.
217. Amerisave is one of the remaining four cases, and those defendants actually paid more than the full
amount of harm they caused. See discussion supra notes 195, 197. In the remaining three cases it is not clear
from the publicly available information why those companies were not required to remediate consumers fully. In
one of those cases, CFPB v. Global Client Sols., LLC, No. 2:14-cv-6643 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2014), the defendants allegedly provided unlawful substantial assistance because they processed payments that allowed other parties to collect unlawful advance fees. Complaint at 3–6, CFPB v. Global Client Sols., LLC, No. 2:14-CV-6643
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2014). Those other parties were not defendants in the case, and the defendants in Global
Client Solutions collectively paid a substantial amount, just over $7 million, CFPB, FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU: FISCAL YEAR 2014 27, 37 (2014), https://files.consumerfinance.
gov/f/201411_cfpb_report_fiscal-year-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC6E-EGC5]; 2016 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 44 n.15, 48, everything they were ordered to pay. Stipulated Final Judgment and Consent Order at
14, 16, CFPB v. Global Client Sols., LLC, No. 2:14-cv-6643 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2014).
218. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.104(b) (2020).
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defendants had remaining resources.219 “[P]arties generally do not state overall
claim amounts in complaints,”220 but studies on arbitration and small claims
court suggest that individuals typically do not arbitrate claims for these
amounts221 or use small-claims courts for these types of claims.222 Thus, private
actions following on CFPB enforcement actions against defendants with limited
resources like these seem unlikely.223
Furthermore, empirical data indicate that private suits often are not filed
covering the same conduct prosecuted in government enforcement litigation. For
example, the CFPB’s arbitration study surveyed 1,150 cases filed by enforcers,
and did not find a related private class action in 88% of the cases.224 Similarly,
in its survey of 114 private class actions, it was not able to find a related government action 66% of the time.225 An analysis of the SEC’s use of fair funds to
provide compensation to harmed investors also determined that in 78.8% of the
217 fair-fund cases, there was no related action providing relief to the investors.226
Defendants in enforcement actions in which the CFPB used the Fund typically caused far more harm than they could remediate themselves.227 Perhaps
unsurprisingly, their business practices resulted in limited assets, bankruptcy, or
even jail, leaving consumers with no realistic recourse. Thus, for all the reasons
219. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 2, at 78.
220. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 187, § 6, at 3.
221. See David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 76–77, 80 & n.176, 91–92 & n.294, 117 (2015) (discussing an Ernst &
Young study of 226 arbitrations filed by consumers against lenders where the median amount was more than
$15,000 and reviewing 4,839 arbitrations filed by consumers—in disputes not limited to financial services—and
finding an average claim of $143,962 and a median of $10,000, but when more than 1,000 AT&T Mobility
matters are removed—each of which claimed $10,000—the average increases to over $183,000 and the median
to $15,000; all told, only 184, or less than 4%, of these cases involved claims less than $1,000); CFPB
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 187, § 5, at 9–10, 23–24 (noting that in a survey of 1,847 arbitrations related
to consumer financial services, affirmative claims by consumers averaged approximately $27,000 with a median
of $11,500 and noting that only approximately twenty-five per year were $1,000 or under).
222. Relatively little empirical data exists on the use of small-claims courts. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY,
supra note 187, § 7, at 4. The available studies suggest that consumers do not use small claims court for claims
like these, although the average claims amounts could be in the range of relief often provided by the Fund. See
Suzanne E. Elwell & Christopher D. Carlson, The Iowa Small Claims Court: An Empirical Analysis, 75 IOWA L.
REV. 433, 487 tbl.G, 489 (1990) (finding that of 1,799 claims filed in small claims court only 4% were filed by
individuals against businesses other than landlords and that most claims filed by individuals sounded in tort);
Bruce Zucker & Monica Her, The People’s Court Examined: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Small Claims
Court System, 37 USF L. REV. 315, 341–42 tbl.4 (2003) (finding that the average claim brought by an individual,
regardless of type of claim or defendant, in small claims court was $2,219 with a median of $1,351). Requiring
consumers to file thousands of cases in small claims court, however, would be vastly more inefficient on a variety
of axes than using a civil penalty fund to provide consumers relief for harm caused by conduct found to be
unlawful.
223. Cf. Velikonja, supra note 54, at 369 (noting that fair-fund cases filed where there were no related
private actions included cases where the likely recovery made any private actions not “cost effective,” where the
defendants were “judgment-proof,” or the fair fund had fully compensated the harmed investors).
224. See CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 187, § 1, at 17; see also discussion supra note 187.
225. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 187, § 1, at 17–18.
226. Velikonja, supra note 54, at 388. In cases where government and private actions both provided relief,
the provision of relief often is coordinated. See discussion supra note 143.
227. See discussion infra Section IV.C.
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discussed above, the consumers harmed by these defendants likely would receive
no relief for the vast majority, if not all, of their harm absent the existence and
use of the Civil Penalty Fund.
D.

The Civil Penalty Fund Efficiently Remediates a Tremendous Amount of
Consumer Harm with Minimal Administrative Overhead

The Civil Penalty Fund primarily pays for itself,228 and it is a very efficient
way to distribute funds to harmed consumers. The CFPB does not publish detailed information about the operating expenses for the fund. Through November
2019,229 however, the amount set aside for operational costs represents less than
1% of the amounts allocated from the Fund, and 1.3% of the amounts already
distributed from the Fund, a very good ratio of overhead to relief delivered.230
This ratio also compares favorably with the FTC’s rate of 2.1% for the administrative expenses over four years of providing refunds to consumers.231 Further,
95% of the allocations have been to consumers to remediate harm caused by
defendants.232 Even assuming that none of the money set aside for administrative
expenses went to start-up costs, the Bureau has distributed at least $74 for each
dollar set aside, and allocated $111.233 Again, ignoring any set-up costs, the Bureau set aside $6.71 for every check sent although the average check amount
across all of the distributions was $494,234 meaning the amount set aside per
check is 1% of the cost of distributing the average check amount. Importantly,
setting aside amounts for administrative expenses has not prevented the Fund
from providing full relief to all consumers with compensable harm.
The amount set aside through February 2020 has covered the costs of setting up the fund, completing 16 distributions, starting another 4, and determining
uncompensated harm and allocating monies to cover those harms in seven additional cases.235 As of November 2019—using penalties paid by defendants and
respondents for their unlawful conduct—the $6.1 million set aside236 allowed the

228. See generally 2016 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 29–33.
229. As of February 2020, the CFPB had not published data regarding any set asides since the March 2019
allocation.
230. See generally 2016 FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 29–41.
231. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FTC Refunds to Customers (Jan. 5, 2021), https://public.tableau.com/
profile/federal.trade.commission#!/vizhome/Refunds_15797958402020/RefundsbyDate
[https://perma.cc/
R7HP-HYSS].
232. In addition to the administrative set-asides, the remaining difference, $28.8 million, was allocated for
consumer education and financial literacy programs. See id.; 12 C.F.R. § 1075.107 (2020); 2016 FINANCIAL
REPORT, supra note 2, at 30 (allocating $13.4 million for such purposes in 2013–15 and $15.4 million in 2016).
233. Given the delays in reporting information regarding distributions, this number may understate the actual figure if the CFPB had not published data on all distributions made. As of February 2020, the CFPB had
finished at least one distribution, but had published only initial data on that distribution.
234. See Cowie, supra note 1.
235. The CFPB may use some of its full-time employees’ time in the operation of the Fund without “paying”
for that time from the funds set aside for operational costs of the Fund. Yet, even if that is true, it seems likely
that the costs of the distributions, which are done by third-party vendors, dwarf any such costs.
236. The Bureau set aside $6,073,322 through March 31, 2019 from the fund to cover administrative expenses. Cowie, supra note 1.
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CFPB to complete a remarkable amount of work, remediating $447.5 million in
consumer harm (by sending over 905,000 checks to consumers harmed in twenty
cases) and allocating an additional $190.9 million for consumers harmed in another seven cases.237
TABLE 9
Distributions
Completed
with Data on
238

Cashing
Completed
without Data
on Cashing
Begun But
Not Completed
No Data On
Distribution
Total

Number
of Cases

Number of
Checks
Sent

Amount
Allocated

Amount
Distributed

15

$226,656,930

$220,745,469

816,603

1

$3,459,336

$2,419,473

2,716

4

$250,144,939

$224,326,019

85,753

7

$190,905,529

27

$671,166,734

$447,490,961

905,072

Estimated
Amount
Cashed
$192,430,905

$192,430,905

The totals in this chart actually understate the actual work completed by the
Fund. There is a significant delay in reporting by the CFPB from the time it actually takes actions related to the Fund.239 For example, the Estimated Amount
Cashed understates the actual amounts cashed, because one completed distribution is not included in that amount and at least four others had started, and therefore consumers presumably had cashed some checks, but the CFPB had not yet
reported the cashing rates for those distributions. As another example, the distributions listed as having no data may have begun although the CFPB has not reported on that fact yet.
Furthermore, the metrics actually understate the Fund’s effectiveness and
likely will improve as the CFPB releases additional data. First, the CFPB has
completed one distribution for which it had not yet published data, meaning that
checks had been sent and cashed; including those cases will increase the amount
distributed per dollar set aside and reduce the amount set aside per check. Second, as more cases are distributed, the effect of any initial set-up costs will be
spread across more cases, thereby reducing any impact. As a result, all of the
metrics will improve. Third, it is possible that although the CFPB had not reported any data, it had begun sending checks in some of the seven distributions

237. See infra Table 9.
238. Although the Bureau had completed sixteen distributions by December 16, 2019, it had published data
regarding only fifteen of the distributions.
239. See, e.g., CFPB, FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU: FISCAL
YEAR 2016 36–38, 46 (Nov. 15, 2016) (providing the first distribution data on the Culver Capital matter when
that distribution began between October 1 and December 31, 2015, and the funds were allocated on November
28, 2014).
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for which there is no data. If so, the amount set aside per check again would
decrease and the amount distributed per dollar set aside would increase.
The Bureau and the FTC have been able to achieve these levels of efficiency in part by outsourcing the actual distributions to expert vendors and
thereby incurring those costs only when necessary to complete distributions. Any
other entity implementing a similar fund also could use vendors, and thus could
set up a fund with only minimal burden on its existing staff and could use the
fund to pay for the vendors.
V. STATES SHOULD IMPLEMENT CONSUMER RESTITUTION FUNDS TO
PROVIDE MONETARY RELIEF TO HARMED CONSUMERS WHO OTHERWISE
WOULD RECEIVE NONE
States should consider implementing a consumer restitution fund to remediate consumers harmed by violations of consumer law. 240 Although the CFPB’s
Civil Penalty Fund is funded only by penalties, a state fund would not have to be
so limited and could be funded by orders requiring disgorgement or payment of
undesignated money into the fund in addition to orders requiring payment of
penalties. As noted above, such a fund can provide substantial relief to consumers with minimal overhead, can pay for itself, and can provide relief in situations
in which it is extremely unlikely that the consumers would receive relief from
any other source.241 Generally speaking, one would not expect most states to be
able to operate a fund on the same scale as the CFPB, both because states often
prosecute fewer cases and they typically collect lower penalties.242 Nonetheless,
a state can operate a fund successfully even if it prosecutes relatively few consumer cases or prosecutes cases primarily against small defendants. Furthermore,
implementing a fund will encourage states to bring important cases they might
not otherwise bring and will undermine potential incentives that might encourage
undesirable prosecutorial decisions.

240. Although this section focuses on states, the same arguments could apply to tribes or to Congress in
other contexts (e.g., allowing the FTC to implement a similar fund).
241. See discussion supra Sections IV.C, IV.D.
242. Compare infra Table 10, with Cox supra note 2, at 75 tbl.9 (noting mean and median net government
money), and id. at 86 fig.8 (noting mean number of cases brought by states). The exception is the large multienforcer cases, which included: seven total cases, each of which was joined by at least forty-two states. See Cox,
supra note 2, at 58–59. These cases had a mean and median net government money that were significantly higher
than the mean and median penalties collected by the CFPB. See id. at 75 tbl.9. It is not clear, however, how much
government money any individual state received from these cases.

COWIE (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1458

A.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

9/13/21 9:29 PM

[Vol. 2021

For a Fund to Operate, a State Must Have Authority to Collect Money
from Defendants and Must Bring Cases Where Consumers Have
Uncompensated Harm

There are two basic preconditions that must be met for a fund to function:
1) The relevant enforcers must have the power to collect money from defendants
in consumer actions, e.g., penalties or other orders to pay money to the state that
are appropriate given the facts of each case,243 and 2) such enforcers must prosecute cases where the defendants do not have the resources to remediate the consumers they harmed, meaning that there will be consumers with uncompensated
harm.
In a study of actions by states in 2014, Cox, Widman, and Totten reported
data that indicate that both preconditions will be met for many states.244 First,
state enforcers imposed penalties in 72.7% of the state cases in the study.245
Thus, many, if not all, states already have the authority to seek penalties and
actually exercise that authority.246 Second, they also found that state enforcers
prosecute consumer cases that result in default judgments: forty-one states had a
combined rate of default judgments in 6.6% of their cases; five other states had
a combined rate of 14.1%, and six states had a rate of 32.2%.247 A default judgment indicates that a defendant failed to defend against an enforcement action.
Whether the default was because the defendant was insolvent, absconding, or
something else, it seems likely that the enforcer will have trouble getting enough
money from defaulting defendants to compensate harmed consumers fully.
Given that many, if not all, states prosecute at least some cases that result in
default judgments, there likely are consumers from at least those cases with uncompensated harm.
By comparison, the CFPB used its fund in 17% of eligible cases.248 In
roughly 30% of the cases in which the Fund was used, the defendants did not pay
the full amount of penalties imposed, and most of those cases involved at least
one default judgment.249 Because the CFPB and courts must consider “the size
243. Although the money could be in the form of penalties, including disgorgement, a state also could authorize its enforcers to order defendants to pay money into the fund in lieu of paying a penalty. Any such monies
should be earmarked for use only by the consumer restitution fund. See infra Appendix A. If states allow private
attorney general actions for consumer cases, those provisions would have to be modified so that penalties given
to the state would go into the consumer restitution fund as well. Cf. Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(a),(f),(i),(j) (West
2016); Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, The New Qui Tam: A Model for the Enforcement of Group Rights in a
Hostile Era, 98 TEX. L. REV. 489, 494 (2020).
244. See Cox, supra note 2, at 68–69.
245. Id. at 73–74.
246. If a state enforcer does not have this authority currently, the state legislature can provide that authority
in the legislation that creates the fund.
247. See Cox supra note 2, at 63, 94 (noting that the states had an overall default rate of 15.5%, although
that rate is skewed high by the states using two particular strategies, and that 6.4% of FTC cases resulted in
default judgments).
248. Cowie, supra note 1. Consumers may receive payments from the Civil Penalty Fund only for activity
for which a civil money penalty was imposed. 12 C.F.R. § 1075.103 (2020). This percentage reflects cases
wherein at least one order imposing a penalty issued prior to March 31, 2019.
249. Cowie, supra note 1.
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of financial resources” of parties when assessing penalties,250 many of the remaining cases involve defendants that pay the full amount assessed—and therefore do not default—but do not have sufficient resources to compensate fully the
consumers they harmed. As noted supra, the defendants in those CFPB actions
caused consumers substantial monetary harm.251 Similarly, consumers in the defaulted state actions likely also had unremediated harm, and as with the CFPB,
it seems possible that there may be additional state actions wherein the defendants do not default but cannot remediate fully the harmed consumers.252
B. States Can Benefit from a Fund Even if They Prosecute Relatively Few
Consumer Cases or Prosecute Them Primarily Against Smaller Defendants
As long as a state can collect and distribute a significant amount253 to consumers while covering its costs, a state can operate a successful fund. The key is
that the state’s enforcers must pursue a mix of cases wherein enough penalties
are collected to allow the fund to provide significant relief to those consumers
harmed by defendants who cannot compensate them. This does not mean, however, that a state must prosecute a large number of cases or sue large defendants
in order to operate a successful fund. Instead, a fund could be operated with a
wide variety of enforcement strategies.
As an initial matter, states that pursue a mix of cases similar to the mix
pursued by the CFPB likely can operate a fund successfully. The CFPB brings a
mix of cases against large entities (like banks), smaller entities, and individuals.
For orders issued during the 2019 fiscal year or before, most of the orders were
against non-banks or jointly against non-banks and individuals (71%)254 with

250. 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c)(3)(A).
251. See discussion supra Section IV.C.1.
252. A state enforcer may resolve an action in a way that does not provide complete relief to consumers
based on a variety of legitimate concerns, including, inter alia, the reality that the defendants in question simply
do not have sufficient resources, the realization that the enforcer likely would not be able to collect significantly
more after litigation, the depletion of defendants’ resources from extended litigation, the harm to consumers from
continued delay in receiving any compensation, the impracticability of calculating individual harm caused by the
specific unlawful acts or practices, and the opportunity costs of the enforcer continuing this litigation rather than
investigating and prosecuting other unlawful conduct. Cox, Widman & Totten found that state enforcers received
public compensation in 62.8% of non-default cases, although 8.6% of the cases had no monetary compensation
(e.g., rescission). Cox supra note 2, at 76–77.
253. Individual states could determine what level constitutes “significant” relief, but the CFPB has used its
Fund when the average check amount was as low as $27, and thousands of consumers considered those checks
worth cashing. See supra Sections III.D, IV.B for a discussion regarding the average check amounts and comparisons with relief in other types of actions. In cases where the typical amount per consumer would be too low
to justify the cost of a distribution, a state could exercise its discretion not to allocate monies from the fund (either
at that time or at all for those consumers).
254. Cowie, supra note 1. Fifty-six percent of the total of all orders were against non-banks alone and 16%
of all orders were against non-banks and individuals jointly. Non-banks range in size from very large (e.g.,
Equifax, which paid a $100 million penalty) to quite small (e.g., Park View Law which had a single employee).
Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 59–60, CFPB v. Equifax, Inc., No. 19-cv03300 (N.D. Ga. July 23, 2019); Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 4, CFPB v. Park View
Law, Inc., No. 17-cv-04721 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2017).
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another 21% against banks and 8% against only individuals.255 The CFPB collected the entire penalty from the vast majority (93%) of orders imposing penalties.256 The CFPB collected 100% of the penalties imposed on banks, 95% on
non-banks alone, 86% on non-banks and individuals, and 73% on individuals
alone.257
The data indicate that the CFPB has prosecuted cases against defendants
with a range of resources. Although the size of the average penalty collected is
not a proxy for the size of the defendant, the ability to pay a large penalty indicates significant resources, and the existence of a de minimis penalty suggests a
lack of resources.258 The average penalty collected from a bank was $23.4 million, although that figure drops to $8 million if two outlier penalties ($500 million259 and $100 million260 respectively) are excluded. The average penalties collected from other types of entities are much smaller. When one considers the
medians and modes, it is clear that a few higher penalties skew the averages
higher in all categories, and in fact, in the majority of cases, the penalties are
significantly below the mean for that category. In addition, in each category aside
from banks, there were instances wherein the defendants paid penalties of only
one or two dollars, indicating that those defendants had few resources.261
TABLE 10: PENALTY STATISTICS BY DEFENDANT TYPE
Type of
Defendant
Mean
Median
Mode
Minimum

Bank
$23,387,230 /
$8,019,854
$4,550,000
$3,500,00
$34,000

Non-Bank
$3,004,197 /
$1,993,824262
$400,000 /
$362,500
$100,000
$1

Non-Bank and
Individual
$1,237,159

Individual
$36,501

$89,400

$1

$1
$1

$1
$1

Because the CFPB pursues this mix of cases, the Civil Penalty Fund has had
sufficient monies to remediate all uncompensated, compensable harm to date.

255. Cowie, supra note 1; see also infra Table 10.
256. Cowie, supra note 1.
257. Id.
258. See 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c)(3)(A) (requiring consideration of the defendants’ resources in determining
the amount of penalties to be assessed).
259. In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Consent Order at 23–24, CFPB No. 2018-BCFP-0001 (Apr. 20, 2018)
(imposing a $1 billion penalty but remitting $500 million based on the payment to the OCC of a $500 million
penalty for related conduct). See generally Craig Cowie, Is the CFPB Still on the Beat? The CFPB’s (Non)Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, 82 MONT. L.R. 41, 76 n.164 (2021) (discussing penalties of $100 million or
more as outliers in the CFPB’s enforcement).
260. In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Consent Order at 17, CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0015 (Sept. 8, 2016) (imposing a $100 million penalty).
261. The CFPB has used the Fund in all cases in which an order imposed a one- or two-dollar penalty prior
to April 1, 2019, and allocation data was not yet available for the orders issued after that date.
262. One case against a nonbank also resulted in an outlier penalty. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 60, CFPB v. Equifax, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-03300 (N.D. Ga. July 23, 2019) (imposing
a $100 million penalty).
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Cox, Widman, and Totten found that states also sue “a large number of very
small actors, yet also bring actions against some of the nation’s largest companies.”263 In particular, they identified an enforcement strategy264 pursued by
some states wherein they prosecuted a large number of consumer cases against
smaller entities and individuals mixed with cases against larger defendants,
which correspondingly recovered greater monetary relief.265 In addition, the case
volumes for the states pursuing this strategy and for the CFPB are comparable.266
Given the similar mix of cases, it seems likely that these states could benefit from
a fund just as the CFPB has benefited.
The benefits of a fund, however, would not be limited just to those states
with a strategy similar to the CFPB’s. A number of states prosecuted a smaller
volume of cases, but still pursued at least one larger defendant wherein they recovered relief higher than the median.267 If that large defendant caused harm that
warranted a large penalty, the collection of that penalty could fund relief to many
consumers in smaller cases.268 Also, some states outsourced their enforcement
activities, pursued larger defendants, and received money “far greater than any
other strategy.”269 In addition, those states obtained only government money
(i.e., no redress for consumers) in almost half of those cases, suggesting that there
might be substantial unremediated consumer harm, and the money in those cases
was often given to the attorney general for “discretionary use,”270 meaning it
might be possible to direct the funds toward providing relief to consumers instead. In each of these cases, it seems likely that states pursuing these strategies
would collect enough penalties to fund relief to consumers.

263. Cox, supra note 2, at 83; see also id. at 61 tbl.1 (noting that the statistics indicate “a number of cases
against very large defendants), 93 fig.13 (noting percentages of cases against various sized defendants by enforcement strategy), 97 fig.18 (same).
264. This discussion does not assume that any given state uses any given strategy currently, as states can
alter their strategies over time. Rather, it uses these strategies as a framework for assessing whether a state could
use of a civil penalty fund successfully if it pursued such an enforcement strategy.
265. Cox supra note 2, at 84–85, 96–97 figs.16, 17 &18 (discussing strategy seven where states pursued
cases against defendants with a range of sizes and recovered more net government money and public compensation than state actions from other strategies).
266. Through its 2019 fiscal year, the CFPB resolved an average of thirty-three orders per fiscal year (beginning with fiscal year 2013) and imposed penalties in an average of twenty-six. See Cox, supra note 2, at 86
fig.8. (noting the mean number of state enforcement actions). The average from prior to the CFPB’s 2013 fiscal
year were excluded from this comparison because the CFPB did not have its complete authority until July 21,
2011 (the designated transfer date). See 12 U.S.C. § 5582; Designated Transfer Date, 75 Fed. Reg. 57,252, 57,253
(Sept. 10, 2010). The CFPB issued only two orders in fiscal year 2012, which was the first full fiscal year after
the designated transfer date, far fewer than in any other fiscal year since. See also Peterson, supra note 2, at 1076
(discussing how the CFPB began its enforcement activities).
267. Cox, supra note 2, at 84–85, 88 (discussing strategies two and three).
268. For example, large, multi-state actions that include all or nearly all states and the District of Columbia
often include large penalties paid to participating states. See, e.g., Press Release, Cal. Dep’t Just., Attorney General Becerra Announces Settlement Against Equifax Providing $600 Million in Consumer Restitution and State
Penalties (July 22, 2019), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-announces-settlement-against-equifax-providing-600 [https://perma.cc/G8HR-SRM2 ] (stating that Equifax paid $175 million in
penalties to the prosecuting states).
269. See Cox supra note 2, at 90–91 (discussing strategy four).
270. Id.
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Even states that pursue relatively few consumer actions271 may benefit
from a fund. Assume a state brings only three or four consumer cases in an average year with an average default rate of 7%. Such a state typically would have
one default case every four years with thirteen cases that did not default. As long
as defendants in the thirteen cases pay penalties that can cover a significant
amount of uncompensated harm, the fund makes operational sense, as it will have
minimal costs until the distribution for that one case272 and the operating costs
are covered by penalties paid by defendants. In addition, a single large case might
provide funds sufficient to remediate consumers harmed in many smaller
cases.273 Ultimately, the only way a fund does not work operationally is if the
enforcer consistently recovers so few penalties that the fund would not be able
to remediate a significant amount of harm caused by defendants and the enforcer
does not wish to alter its enforcement strategy (or cannot) by altering the mix of
cases or bringing more cases.274
Similarly, some states pursue a high volume of cases but recover relatively
low amounts of relief (both in government money, including penalties, and in
redress for consumers).275 Although these states also have had higher default
rates,276 they also frequently specifically identify a small number of consumers
who have been harmed by the defendants.277 If there are a small number of identified consumers in the defaulted cases as well, the penalties collected may be
sufficient to provide significant relief to those consumers, especially given the
high volume of cases. Thus, the fund may work even though the overall amount
of relief may be low compared to other states or the CFPB.
In addition, if the state typically is identifying a small number of consumers
who are harmed, the structure of a fund could reflect that approach, resulting in
lower overhead costs. For example, the fund could just be used to provide relief
to consumers whose identity and harm are specified in an order. Such a structure
would not have the scope of other funds but would be tailored to the individual
state’s enforcement practices and would be more straightforward to administer.

271. Id. at 86 fig.8 (noting that the twenty-seven states in strategies one through four resolved an average
of less than five cases, although there were states in both strategies three and four that received large amounts of
relief).
272. The timing of the defaulted case may matter, especially in the initial years of the fund where the balance
of the fund may be quite low. If the fund does not contain enough to compensate consumers fully, however, the
state could either order a partial distribution or could exercise its discretion to wait until there are sufficient funds.
See infra Appendix A.
273. See Cox, supra note 2, at 85 (noting that states using low-volume strategies three and four do have
cases with large recoveries).
274. Even if a state has a history of not prosecuting consumer actions. See id. at 88 (identifying four states
that brought zero UDAP cases in 2014), a legislature might mandate (or an enforcer might request) establishment
of a fund in an attempt to incentivize (by creating reputational rewards) its enforcers to bring such cases. See
discussion infra Section V.C. Obviously if there are no consumer cases, and therefore no identified classes of
harmed consumers, establishing a fund does not make sense. See infra Appendix A.
275. Cox, supra note 2, at 91–95.
276. Id. at 94.
277. Id. at 93.

COWIE (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 4]

C.

PUTTING MONEY BACK INTO CONSUMERS’ POCKETS

9/13/21 9:29 PM

1463

The Existence of a Consumer Restitution Fund Will Encourage Enforcers
to Bring Important Cases and Undercut Potential Incentives Leading to
Undesirable Outcomes

Large defendants operate on a scale that means they can cause enormous
amounts of harm when they violate the law, and it is important that enforcers
prosecute such cases and impose commensurate penalties to deter future wrongdoing.278 These defendants often have substantial legitimate lines of business and
have the resources to pay redress and appropriate penalties. But as this Article
demonstrates, defendants with few resources, and often with business models
that cannot operate lawfully, also cause a significant amount of harm, and enforcers should prosecute them as well.
As an initial matter, there is some debate as to whether enforcers should
pursue “judgment-proof defendants.”279 Of course, if an enforcer prosecutes defendants with limited resources, there is a risk, or even a likelihood, that the defendants will not be able to pay much, either in penalties or in redress. This fact
then raises the question of whether it is an appropriate use of limited enforcement
resources to pursue such cases. Given the amount of harm these defendants can
cause, as demonstrated herein,280 the answer is unequivocally yes,281 especially
given that the defendants’ limited resources likely will prevent any private action.282
Simply stopping the harm is a significant goal in and of itself. As just one
example, in an action against the Hoffman Law Group and others, the CFPB and
the State of Florida seized the assets of the defendants, recovering more than
$650,000 from them and ceasing their operations.283 Despite the defendants’ lim-

278. See, e.g., Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 3, 49, 59–60, CFPB v.
Equifax, Inc., No. 19-cv-3300 (N.D. Ga. July 23, 2019) (imposing a $100 million penalty and $425 million
judgment for illegal conduct that harmed approximately 147 million consumers); Consent Order at 36, 45, In re
Citibank, N.A., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0015 (July 21, 2015) (imposing a $35 million penalty for illegal conduct
that caused at least $700 million in harm to approximately 8.8 million consumers); Consent Order at 10, 24 &
31, In re Bank of America, N.A., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-2014 (Apr. 9, 2014) (imposing a $20 million penalty
for illegal conduct that caused over $459 million in harm to approximately 1.5 million consumers).
279. Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853, 884
(2014) (noting concerns with enforcers failing to collect penalties from defendants with limited resources).
280. See discussion supra Sections III.B, IV.C.
281. This is not to say that an enforcer always should bring cases against defendants with limited resources,
rather the fact that a defendant may have few resources should not rule out bringing a case. An enforcer’s determination whether to bring a given case always will depend on the enforcer’s policy goals and the specific facts
of each case. See, e.g., Prentiss Cox, Public Enforcement Compensation and Private Rights, 100 MINN. L. REV.
2313, 2350 & 2350 n.190 (2016) (noting that deterrence is a “core goal of civil law enforcement” and citing
others). There are many valid considerations in addition to the amount of harm being caused, including, inter
alia, establishing case law on a specific issue, deterring similar actions by other defendants, and training enforcement attorneys on cases with lower stakes.
282. Given the defendants’ limited resources, if a government enforcer does not stop the conduct, it is not
clear it will be economically viable for anyone else to do so. See discussion supra Section IV.C.
283. Default Judgment & Ord. as to Corp. Defs. at 16–17, CFPB v. Michael Harper, No. 9:14-cv-80931
(S.D. Fla. May 28, 2015); Stipulated Final Judgment & Ord. as to Def. Benn Wilcox at 13–14, CFPB v. Michael
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ited assets, however, they had caused more than $11.7 million in harm by collecting substantial unlawful fees from distressed homeowners.284 Absent action,
these defendants would have continued to hemorrhage the savings of already
distressed consumers.
Despite the benefit of bringing cases against defendants with limited resources, there may be incentives against bringing such cases. Implementing a
consumer restitution fund would create positive counter-incentives to bring such
cases while also creating incentives that would encourage enforcers not to ignore
larger defendants whose illegal conduct is having a widespread impact. In other
words, a fund encourages enforcers to bring cases against a beneficial mix of
defendants.
Commentators have argued that financial incentives derived from large
penalties will cause enforcement agencies to focus on “deep-pocketed” defendants rather than cases like the above.285 These incentives arise both because some
enforcers may keep the recoveries for their own use286 and because the enforcer
will receive a reputational reward (i.e., good press) from the imposition, and collection, of a large penalty.287 Although there is debate on this argument,288 the

Harper, No. 9:14-cv-80931 (S.D. Fla. May 5, 2015) (requiring defendant to turn over $90,000 in personal property); Stipulated Final Judgment & Ord. as to Def. Michael Harper at 15–17, CFPB v. Michael Harper, No. 9:14cv-80931 (S.D. Fla. May 5, 2015) (requiring defendant to turn over $50,000 in jewelry); Stipulated Final Judgment & Ord. as to Def. Marc Hoffman at 14–15, CFPB v. Michael Harper, No. 9:14-cv-80931 (S.D. Fla. May 6,
2015) (requiring defendant to transfer rights to any outstanding estates or inheritances to the receiver).
284. The corporate defendants forfeited all remaining seized assets. Default Judgment & Ord. as to Corp.
Defs. at 16–17, CFPB v. Michael Harper, No. 9:14-cv-80931 (S.D. Fla. May 28, 2015) (requiring defendants to
pay the full balance of the receivership estate, and requiring any person holding corporate assets to turn them
over); Stipulated Final Judgment & Ord. as to Def. Benn Wilcox at 13, 15–16, CFPB v. Michael Harper, No.
9:14-cv-80931 (S.D. Fla. May 5, 2015) (basing suspension of judgment on sworn financial documents and testimony regarding his and the corporate defendants’ financial resources); Stipulated Final Judgment & Ord. as to
Def. Marc Hoffman at 14, 16 CFPB v. Michael Harper, No. 9:14-cv-80931 (S.D. Fla. May 6, 2015) (same); Ord.
at 15–17, CFPB v. Michael Harper, No. 9:14-cv-80931 (S.D. Fla. May 5, 2015) (same).
285. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 279, at 903 (“We have argued that, on balance, financially motivated
public enforcement means more public enforcement; that such enforcement will tend to focus on maximizing
financial recoveries rather than securing injunctive relief and, thus, often will target deep-pocketed defendants[.]”).
286. Id. at 863; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2527 (West 2019) (mandating payment of penalties into
a fund for payment of operational expenses related to enforcing consumer laws); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-143
(2019) (requiring payment of penalties into either the general fund or a special revenue account for defraying
certain expenses).
287. Bill Chappell, Wells Fargo Hit with $1 Billion in Fines Over Home and Auto Loan Abuses, NPR
(Apr. 20, 2018, 9:12 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/20/604279604/wells-fargo-hitwith-1-billion-in-fines-over-consumer-abuses [https://perma.cc/MDC2-T476]; Renae Merle, U.S. to Fine Wells
Fargo $1 Billion–the Most Aggressive Bank Penalty of the Trump Era, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2018, 4:21 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/regulators-planning-to-slap-wells-fargo-with-1-billionfine/2018/04/19/ec1f58c6-4415-11e8-ad8f-27a8c409298b_story.html [https://perma.cc/KV5V-SJHE]; Patrick
Rucker, Exclusive: U.S. Watchdog Seeks Record Fine Against Wells Fargo for Abuses–Sources, REUTERS
(Apr. 9, 2018, 12:27 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wells-fargo-accounts-fine-exclusive/exclusive-us-watchdog-seeks-record-fine-against-wells-fargo-for-abuses-sources-idUSKBN1HG2PO [https://perma.cc/B7
RQ-ELFJ].
288. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 2, at 80–83 (noting a sizeable number of FTC cases against a “large number
of smaller entity defendants and related individuals” and of state enforcers against “a large number of very small
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existence of a fund will eliminate the first incentive, and create a similar reputational reward for pursuing defendants that cannot pay huge sums, thereby counteracting the second incentive.
First, because any civil money penalties will be directed to a fund, rather
than to the enforcer’s own coffers, there will not be a direct financial incentive
to pursue only cases against defendants that can pay significant penalties. Second, the fund will create a new incentive—in addition to the existing incentive
simply to stop the substantial harm that defendants with limited resources can
cause—to bring cases against defendants with shallow or empty pockets, because
the enforcer will be able to receive a reputational reward by providing redress
through the fund. In addition, if the fund remains unused, pressure will grow to
bring cases where it can be used in order to avoid reputational harm from claims
that the funds are being wasted. Third, while encouraging cases against defendants with limited resources, the fund also creates an incentive for the enforcer
not to focus solely on those types of defendants,289 because a fund will only generate reputational rewards if the enforcer pursues cases where the defendants can
pay the penalties in addition to pursuing those who cannot.
The use of a fund also allows an enforcer to signal to stakeholders—including consumers, legislatures, and others—the importance of a case that might not
otherwise be visible.290 First, absent a fund, an enforcer may have an incentive
not to publicize the amount of harm caused when the defendant cannot remediate
the harm. The enforcer can do nothing to remediate the harm, and if it publicizes
the amount, it may just highlight that fact and be criticized as ineffectual. Second,
although an enforcer can signal the importance of a case by imposing a significant penalty, that signal may be seriously undermined if it becomes public that
the defendants never paid the penalty. Third, the value of preventing future harm,
from this defendant or others, is hard to quantify,291 especially if there is no indication of the amount of harm already caused by these defendants. By contrast,
if there is a fund, the enforcer has an incentive to publish the amount of harm it
remediated through the fund. Stakeholders then can compare the harm addressed
across various cases292 and can use the harm to estimate the benefit from preventing the future harm as well.

actors”). Cox, Widman & Totten also noted at least two categories of state enforcers that brought a large number
of cases against “individuals or tiny businesses.” Id. at 85 (strategies five and six).
289. See, e.g., id. at 84–85, 87 fig. 9 (identifying a number of states in 2014 that prosecuted only, or primarily, defendants and individuals with few resources).
290. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 279, at 879 (stating that “[e]nforcement is often invisible to those who
benefit from it”).
291. Id. at 875.
292. This metric can be valuable even if a primary benefit of the enforcement action is requiring the defendant to adopt affirmative measures (e.g., implement compliance systems), because it highlights the need for
those systems. Of course, there will be cases where monetary harm to consumers is impracticable to quantify
(e.g., the harm from an illegal kickback that does not have an easily determined impact on the prices paid by a
consumer), but where the enforcer’s policy goals justify the action.
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Indeed, Lemos & Minzner have noted that using penalties as a signal may
be problematic,293 and any such concerns only grow if the defendants have defaulted or otherwise cannot pay them. Assuming arguendo that there is any incentive to impose steep, but toothless, penalties on defendants with few resources
in order to justify the action (and receive a reputational reward), a fund allows
enforcers to achieve a similar reputational reward and to demonstrate the importance of the case by redressing the harm, while also providing actual relief to
harmed consumers. Further, the harm arguably is a more accurate signal, as it
reflects a direct impact on the marketplace from the defendants’ unlawful conduct.294 It also allows the stakeholders to compare cases and reach their own
determination as to the importance of cases, whereas penalties reflect only the
enforcer’s perspective.
In addition, the payments themselves may act as a different kind of signal
to consumers, informing them, and perhaps by extension their communities,
about types of services or products that are unlawful. These consumers may then
be less likely to be deceived in the first instance by similarly unlawful services
or products or more likely to complain to the enforcer about other unlawful acts
or practices.
Because a fund encourages the prosecution of a mix of cases, it also generates valuable signals to other market participants, both those with substantial resources and those without. Participants with resources understand their own possible exposure from engaging in similar conduct. They understand how the
enforcer will quantify harm, and because the fund eliminates reputational penalties that may result from transparency regarding a defendant’s lack of resources,
they can evaluate the amount of penalties against a given defendant in the context
of that defendant’s resources,295 and thereby make more accurate projections as
to their own possible exposure based on their resources. They also understand
that the enforcer will have incentives to pursue participants like them. Likewise,
participants without resources will understand that their lack of resources will
not make them immune to prosecution.
A fund also creates an incentive to actually collect the penalties imposed.
Lemos and Minzner have argued that some enforcers do not collect penalties and
that—assuming they cannot keep the penalties themselves—they do not lose reputation by failing to collect.296 For that to be true, it must be the case that the

293. See, e.g., Lemos & Minzner, supra note 279, at 877, 907 (“Penalty amounts are—at best—an imperfect
metric for gauging the importance of any given case. . . . [Enforcers] may be tempted to use high-value monetary
recoveries to make unimportant cases seem important”); cf. id. at 856–57, 869 (discussing similar concerns with
civil asset forfeiture); Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 513 (2012); Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 45 (2014).
294. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 279, at 875. There may be additional impacts that harm alone cannot
signal, like any competitive disadvantage faced by lawful actors.
295. 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c)(3)(A); see infra Table 10. For example, the CFPB has sought penalties of only
$1 in some cases involving limited resources.
296. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 279, at 875, 886

COWIE (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 4]

PUTTING MONEY BACK INTO CONSUMERS’ POCKETS

9/13/21 9:29 PM

1467

failure to collect is unnoticed, at least to some audience. Even if the failure remains hidden to the general public, including both consumers and other stakeholders like legislatures, word will get around to potential defendants (and their
lawyers) that the enforcers’ orders are toothless, drastically undercutting if not
completely eliminating any deterrence effect from the orders. Having a fund,
however, creates an incentive to collect the penalties, as otherwise the fund cannot work. It also increases the likelihood that any failure to collect will become
public, either because of reporting required by the legislation creating the fund297
or because interested stakeholders will want to know why the fund is not being
funded and used.
The CFPB has collected in full at least 94% of the penalties imposed in
orders from March 31, 2019, or earlier.298 Even among the cases where the
CFPB’s Civil Penalty Fund has been used, because the defendants did not have
sufficient resources to remediate the harm themselves, the defendants in twenty
of the twenty-seven cases paid in full the amounts ordered.299 The CFPB and
courts must take into account, however, the defendant’s resources in imposing
penalties,300 and the total penalties imposed in nine of the twenty cases was $2
or less.301
Some may argue that a fund will create a perverse incentive to impose high
penalties on one defendant, who can afford to pay them, in order to use those
penalties to receive an additional reputational reward by remediating consumers
harmed by a different defendant—in essence robbing Peter to pay Paul. An assessment of the proper considerations in imposing civil money penalties is beyond the scope of this Article. Such an argument, however, has little merit. First,
to avoid missing the forest for the trees, it bears noting that remediating consumers harmed by unlawful conduct is in the public interest, and incentivizing such
payments is in the public good. That being said, the ability to remediate consumers in one case is not an acceptable consideration in the determination of an appropriate penalty in another case. Penalties must be imposed based on only the
facts of the case in question.302 If one assumes that enforcers will impose inappropriately large penalties in order to achieve reputational rewards, or in order to
fund its operations, a civil restitution fund would not exacerbate that problem
because the enforcer already has an incentive to impose as high a penalty as is
possible, either to get the largest reputational reward from the imposition of the
penalty itself or to collect the most money for itself. Furthermore, any incentive
to increase the penalties to achieve a reputational reward from providing redress

297. See infra Appendix A.
298. Cowie, supra note 1.
299. Id.
300. 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c)(3)(A).
301. Cowie, supra note 1.
302. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c)(2) (establishing various maximum penalty amounts based, in essence,
on whether the defendants recklessly or knowingly engaged in the unlawful conduct), § 5565(c)(3) (mandating
consideration of various factors in determining penalty amounts, including the gravity of the violations, the
amount of consumer harm, and the defendants’ financial resources).
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to harmed consumers is far, far weaker than the possible direct incentive to increase penalties created by a framework that requires penalties to be paid into the
state’s general fund or allows them to be used by the enforcer itself—an incentive
that a consumer restitution fund eliminates completely. To the extent one wishes
to address the question of how to determine an appropriate penalty, one should
address that question directly by creating statutory guidelines for the assessment
of penalties, rather than approaching the question indirectly through an incentive
structure and in so doing losing the opportunity implement a mechanism that will
remediate consumers’ actual, substantial, monetary harm.
D.

In Creating a Fund, States Should Establish Guidelines on Its Operations

As noted above, states can create a fund that is tailored to their expected
volume of cases and scope of harm to be remediated. For example, a state with a
small volume of cases might create a streamlined fund wherein payments go into
the fund and payments are made from the fund only as directed by the orders in
the relevant enforcement actions. Such a fund would require few resources and
would be administratively simple. A state with a higher volume, on the other
hand, may want to create a more formal structure that guides the exercise of discretion in allocating and distributing funds. Either way, states must decide on the
appropriate balance of discretion and formal requirements (e.g., with respect to
what money is paid into the fund and how payments are made from the fund). In
so doing, states considering implementing a consumer restitution fund should
consider three key issues: what money goes into the fund, who can receive payments from the fund, and what happens if the fund is not large enough to compensate all of the consumers eligible to receive payments. By considering these
issues at the creation of the fund, a state can avoid critiques of arbitrariness, favoritism, or partisanship and can ensure that a fund operates as it intended.
First, penalties imposed in CFPB enforcement actions must go into the
Civil Penalty Fund, and no other payments by defendants do. States can require
that payments in addition to penalties go into a consumer restitution fund, including disgorgement or orders to pay amounts other than penalties into the fund.
States also can make payments into the fund discretionary rather than mandatory.
Making payments into the fund discretionary or allowing payments from the fund
for anything other than remediating consumers, however, reduces stakeholder
clarity regarding when and how the fund will be used, may expose the state to
critiques regarding the use, and will undermine the incentive benefits derived
from a fund.
Second, the CFPB also limits payments to consumers harmed by defendants who have been assessed a civil money penalty for the unlawful conduct that
harmed the consumers303 and provides relief to all consumers harmed by that
conduct,304 but neither is required. A state could allow payments to consumers
harmed by defendants against whom any relief (e.g., injunctive relief) is ordered
303.
304.

12 C.F.R. § 1075.103 (2020).
To the extent it is practicable to identify them and remediate their harm. See id. § 1075.104.
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for violations that harmed the consumers or in cases in which the enforcer has
proved harm from violations of consumer law but cannot identify the perpetrator
(e.g., a default judgment against a Doe defendant). And as is noted above, states
might limit relief to those individuals specifically identified in the orders. In order to make remediation more effective and to lower administrative costs, enforcers should require defendants to produce information identifying harmed
consumers whenever possible (e.g. contact information and data on the amount
of harm suffered).305
Third, the state will have to decide how to apportion funds if there are not
sufficient amounts in the fund to compensate all of the uncompensated harm
from the state’s relevant cases. The Civil Penalty Fund Rule leaves this to the
discretion of those in charge of the fund. A state could do likewise, or it could
require that there be available funds when its enforcers identify those who are
eligible for payments. Because many consumers will benefit from even partial
remediation, allowing for partial payments in some fashion likely is the best
course, especially given that these consumers are not likely to recover anything
from any other source. In addition, a state may want to consider limiting the
rights to assign payments from the fund to ensure the relief goes completely to
harmed consumers. Regardless of the ultimate determination, establishing these
guidelines from the beginning will reduce claims of favoritism or arbitrariness in
the way the funds are distributed. Sample language creating a fund is provided
in Appendix A.
V. CONCLUSION
As demonstrated by the empirical analyses above, the CFPB’s Civil Penalty
Fund efficiently provides consumers with substantial monetary relief, putting
money back into consumers’ pockets in cases where consumers could get little
or no compensation from the wrongdoers. The Fund has allocated more than
$671 million in 27 cases through the end of the CFPB’s 2019 fiscal year. The
defendants in these cases typically have caused individual consumers tremendous amounts of harm. In the great majority of these cases, the average check
sent from the Fund was $1,000 or more. But in 85% of the cases, the data strongly
suggests that the companies who broke the law could pay very little back to consumers, as they had few resources, were bankrupt, were ordered to cease operations, or went out of business. Overall, the companies in all 27 cases paid only
for 7% of the harm they caused, and in half of the cases, they paid less than 1%
305. See, e.g., How the FTC Provides Refunds, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/refunds/how-ftc-provides-refunds (last visited May 13, 2021) [https://perma.cc/7Z4U-FGBH] (“FTC court
orders typically require the company to provide a list of customers, their contact information, and how much each
customer paid.”); cf. 2019 FTC CLASS ACTION REPORT, supra note 105, at 7 (noting that remediation by the FTC
depends on the quality of the consumer data available); Velikonja, supra note 54, at 342 (noting that one of the
two key factors the SEC considers in determining whether to distribute money from a fair fund to harmed investors is whether there is an identifiable class of victims with identifiable harm); 12 C.F.R. § 1075.104(b)(3)
(providing for a pro rata share of the allocation if it is “impracticable to assess the uncompensated harm of individual victims in a class”), 1075.109(a)(3) (deeming payments as impracticable when the “victim cannot be located with effort that is reasonable in light of the amount of the payment”).
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of the harm. The CFPB provided consumers with relief for the remaining 93%
of their harm by using the Fund. In addition to providing consumers with relief
that they otherwise likely would not get, the Fund creates incentives for government enforcers to bring a healthy mix of cases, including cases against large defendants with many resources as well as cases against smaller defendants with
few resources who nonetheless cause substantial harm.
States and other enforcers also have constituent consumers who are harmed
by defendants who cannot pay consumers back, and these enforcers would benefit in similar ways from the creation of a fund to provide harmed consumers
with restitution. These enforcers could implement such a fund in a way that dovetails with their particular enforcement strategy, and even enforcers who bring
relatively few consumer cases or prosecute cases primarily against smaller defendants could operate a consumer restitution fund successfully.

VI. APPENDIX A - MODEL LANGUAGE TO CREATE A CONSUMER
RESTITUTION FUND
There is established a separate fund, to be known as the “Consumer Restitution Fund.” All civil money penalties306 collected as a result of any action prosecuting violations of consumer law shall be deposited in the Consumer Restitution Fund.
Monies deposited in the Consumer Restitution Fund may be used only for
payments to consumers for harm from violations of consumer law that are prosecuted in actions for which a final order has issued. Determinations regarding the
use of monies in the Consumer Restitution Fund must be made regularly, and on
at least an annual basis.
Reports regarding the operation of the Consumer Restitution Fund, including descriptions of the monies paid into the Consumer Restitution Fund, the payments made from the Consumer Restitution Fund, and the costs of operating the
Consumer Restitution Fund, must be published regularly, and on at least an annual basis.
This Act does not create a right to a payment from the Consumer Restitution Fund of any amount for any person, and this Act does not create a private
right of action for any person with respect to a payment from the Consumer Restitution Fund to that person or any other person.

306. Note: Other existing laws regarding the imposition of civil money penalties and where they must be
deposited may have to be amended to conform with the intent of this Act. In addition, if the Department does not
have the authority to seek penalties in Consumer Enforcement Actions currently, that authority will have to be
added as well. Finally, in resolving matters, the Department should be sure to include language making the failure
to comply with the settlement’s terms (including the payment of civil money penalties) a violation of the settlement that the Department may prosecute independently without litigating the underlying violations of Consumer
Law and should require the defendants to waive any right to contest the underlying facts in any action regarding
a breach of the settlement.
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Definitions:
“Consumer” means a person who purchases or leases goods, services,
real property, or information primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
• “Consumer Law” means [define the state laws to be considered consumer law, e.g., the state consumer protection act, and for which remediation from the Fund will be possible] and Federal consumer financial
law, as that term is defined at 12 U.S.C. 5481(14).
• “Final Order” means a consent order, settlement, stipulation, or other
court order that is no longer appealable and for which no appeals are
pending. For purposes of this definition, “appeals” includes any petitions for reconsideration, rehearing, or certiorari.
•
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